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Originality Proxies
TOWARD A THEORY OF COPYRIGHT AND
CREATIVITY
Eva E. Subotnik†
INTRODUCTION
Theoretically, a perfect photograph is absolutely inexhaustible. In a
picture you can find nothing which the artist has not seen before
you; but in a perfect photograph there will be as many beauties
lurking, unobserved, as there are flowers that blush unseen in
forests and meadows.1

The recent copyright “case” célèbre Shepard Fairey v.
Associated Press,2 a dispute over images at the heart of a
successful presidential campaign, involved a photograph that
depicted the intent face of Barack Obama framed by the soft
backdrop of the American flag (the “Obama Photograph”).

† Assistant Professor of Law, St. John’s University School of Law. The funding
for this article was generously provided by the Kernochan Center for Law, Media and the
Arts at Columbia Law School during my tenure as an Intellectual Property Fellow. Many
thanks to Johan Axhamn, June Besek, Vincent Blasi, Robert Clarida, Jessica Clarke,
Mathilde Cohen, Brett Dakin, Erin Delaney, Harold Edgar, Christine Haight Farley,
Robert Ferguson, Jane Ginsburg, Lital Helman, Scott Hemphill, Bert Huang, Dan
Hunter, Kathryn Judge, Michael Kavey, Joseph Landau, Greg Lastowka, Dina Leytes,
Phillipa Loengard, Clarisa Long, Jeffrey Malkan, Saira Mohamed, Anthony O’Rourke,
Burak Ozgen, Jessica Roberts, Bertrall Ross, Tali Schaefer, David Simon, Irene Ten Cate,
Rebecca Tushnet, Carissa Vogel, Martha Woodmansee, Tim Wu, Diane Leenheer
Zimmerman, the participants of the 2010 Intellectual Property Scholars Conference, and
the participants of the Columbia Law School Associates and Fellows Workshop. This
article is dedicated to the memory of Professor Mayer Freed, greatly missed, who was
similarly drawn to law and photography.
1
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Sr., The Stereoscope and the Stereograph, in
CLASSIC ESSAYS ON PHOTOGRAPHY 71, 77-78 (Alan Trachtenberg ed., 1980).
2
No. 09 Civ. 1123 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 9, 2009).
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AP Images/Mannie Garcia

The case proceeded under competing theories of infringement
and fair use, inquiring into the nature of the relationship
between the photograph, taken by AP photographer Mannie
Garcia,3 and the campaign posters that graphic artist Shepard
Fairey created based on it. Thus, the court filings probed
whether the posters were sufficiently “transformative,” in the
parlance of fair use, and whether they usurped the photograph’s
rightful market.4 Also swirling around the Obama Photograph
were important and recurring questions about the level of
originality and authorship reflected in the photograph itself.
Cultural critic Luc Sante, for example, suggested that such a
photograph “might have been taken by a child or a robot or a
chimpanzee—it’s nowhere near as hard as randomly typing
Shakespeare, and for that matter, it’s a lot more a matter of luck
than are most of the great pieces of photojournalism.”5
3

At one point in the litigation, the nature of Garcia’s relationship with the
AP during the relevant period, that of independent contractor or employee status, was
contested; Garcia, who claimed the former status, ultimately withdrew from the
litigation. See Stipulation of Discontinuance With Prejudice, Fairey v. Associated
Press, No. 09 Civ. 1123 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 20, 2010).
4
See, e.g., Amended Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and Injunctive
Relief, at 4, 11, Fairey v. Associated Press, No. 09 Civ. 1123 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 13, 2009);
Associated Press’s First Amended Answer, Affirmative Defenses and Counterclaims, at
14-15, Fairey v. Associated Press, No. 09 Civ. 1123 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 12, 2009)
[hereinafter AP Amended Answer].
5
Noam Cohen, Viewing Journalism as a Work of Art, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23,
2009, at C2 (quoting Sante).
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Provocative as Sante’s comments are, they do not
purport to address—and yet succeed in raising—the legal
question of whether the Obama Photograph is an original work
of authorship entitling it to copyright protection.6 One might
suppose that the answer to this question was a foregone
conclusion; photographs—especially those of human subjects—
have long been deemed, on the highest authority, a worthy
subject for copyright protection.7 Further, the instances in
which courts have denied them protection on originality
grounds are very rare and, so far, untested by appellate
review.8 Nevertheless, court dockets bustle with copyright
litigation in which the defendant argues that the plaintiff’s
photograph lacks originality. Courts continue to feel it
necessary (and perhaps enjoy the opportunity) to engage at
length with this argument.9 Copyright scholars, too, have
continued to question the originality of photographs taken in
varying contexts and for varying purposes.10 Some scholarship
has taken explicit issue with the protection available for the
likes of the Obama Photograph. Accepting the photograph’s
likely protectability under the current copyright regime,
Professor Joseph Miller has maintained that, to the extent
such an “accurate, anodyne, [and] conventional” photograph is

6

See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006) (providing for copyright protection for
“original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression”); Feist
Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991) (determining that
originality is a constitutional requirement for copyright protection).
7
See Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 60 (1884); see
also Thornton v. Schreiber, 124 U.S. 612 (1888); infra Part I.A.
8
In Oriental Art Printing Inc. v. GS Printing Corp., 34 Fed. App’x 401 (2d
Cir. 2002), the Second Circuit did not reach the district court’s conclusion on this
question. Id. at 402.
9
Almost fifty years ago, Professor Robert Gorman noted how much time courts
spent on the question of originality in photography; the issue remains lively today. See
Robert A. Gorman, Copyright Protection for the Collection and Representation of Facts, 76
HARV. L. REV. 1569, 1596 (1963).
10
See, e.g., JUSTIN HUGHES, The Photographer’s Copyright, in AUTHOR IN THE
MACHINE: CREATIVITY, COPYRIGHT, AND THE COMPUTER (October 2010) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with the author); Kathleen Connolly Butler, Keeping the World
Safe from Naked-Chicks-in-Art Refrigerator Magnets: The Plot to Control Art Images in
the Public Domain Through Copyrights in Photographic and Digital Reproductions, 21
HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 55, 103-14 (1998); Gorman, supra note 9, at 1594-1600;
Jeffrey L. Harrison, Rationalizing the Allocative/Distributive Relationship in Copyright,
32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 853, 898-904 (2004); Michael J. Madison, Beyond Creativity:
Copyright as Knowledge Law, 12 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 817, 818-19 (2010); Joseph
Scott Miller, Hoisting Originality, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 451, 456-57 (2009).
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sufficiently original so as to be protected by copyright, “so much
the worse . . . for copyright law.”11
So, should this photograph be considered original for the
purpose of copyright? Should all photographs? This article
contends that a definitive account of originality as a legal
construct is not possible and that, as a result, the current low
threshold for originality should be maintained. Under this
analysis, most photographs, so long as they comply with
certain requirements, should be granted protection, at the very
least, against exact copying (for example, through digital
copying and pasting). Arriving at this conclusion, however,
requires a return to first principles, that is, to the copyright
concepts of authorship and originality. These concepts saw
their most recent articulation by the Supreme Court in the
1991 landmark decision of Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural
Telephone Service Co., which held that the white page phone
listings before it did not merit copyright protection.12 The Court
determined that originality is a constitutional prerequisite for
copyright protection and that it entails a two-pronged showing:
(1) “that the work was independently created” (that is, that it
was not copied), and (2) that the work manifests “some
minimal degree of creativity.”13 The white page listings failed
on the second count; they comprised a factual compilation
reflecting insufficient “creative spark.”14
Since Feist was handed down, a vast body of academic
work has focused on how the decision should apply outside its
immediate factual predicate to other sorts of works. One group
of scholars has focused on the degree to which fact-driven
works, such as maps, site plans, and many compilations,
should be afforded—post-Feist—the protections of copyright
law.15 For some, there was concern that socially useful works
11

Miller, supra note 10, at 456; see also Madison, supra note 10, at 818-19
(questioning the creative merits of the Obama Photograph). For additional discussion
of various aspects of the Obama Photograph, including protectability, scope of
protection, and fair use, see HUGHES, supra note 10, at 28-32 and H. Brian Holland,
Social Semiotics in the Fair Use Analysis, 24 HARV. J.L. & TECH. (forthcoming 2011).
12
499 U.S. 340 (1991).
13
Id. at 345.
14
Id. at 345, 362-64.
15
See, e.g., Howard B. Abrams, Originality and Creativity in Copyright Law,
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1992, at 3; Alan L. Durham, Speaking of the World:
Fact, Opinion and the Originality Standard of Copyright, 33 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 791 (2001);
Jane C. Ginsburg, No “Sweat”? Copyright and Other Protection of Works of Information
After Feist v. Rural Telephone, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 338 (1992); Justin Hughes, Created
Facts and the Flawed Ontology of Copyright Law, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 43 (2007);
Dennis S. Karjala, Copyright and Creativity, 15 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 169 (2008)
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that could be characterized as “too factual” would be produced
at suboptimal levels in the face of uncertain protection.16 A
second group of scholars has addressed the ways in which Feist
should be applied to works closer to what we might loosely
deem “the arts.”17 As Professor Robert Gorman noted, Feist
“does not address—obviously, the Court had no cause to—the
question of how the ‘creative spark’ standard is to be applied to
works of art, music and literature.”18 A number of the scholars
taking up this latter question have expressed the opposite
concern from the first group. They have cautioned that too many
nominally creative works are granted the exclusivity rights of
copyright and that these sorts of works ought to undergo more
robust scrutiny on originality grounds.19
Situating photography on the fact-art continuum
suggested by Feist, and theorizing whether the opinion might

[hereinafter Karjala, Copyright and Creativity]; Dennis S. Karjala, Copyright in
Electronic Maps, 35 JURIMETRICS J. 395 (1995); Douglas Lichtman, Copyright as a Rule of
Evidence, 52 DUKE L.J. 683 (2003); Jessica Litman, After Feist, 17 U. DAYTON L. REV. 607
(1992); Leo J. Raskind, Assessing the Impact of Feist, 17 U. DAYTON L. REV. 331 (1992);
Pamela Samuelson, The Originality Standard for Literary Works Under U.S. Copyright
Law, 42 AM. J. COMP. L. SUPP. 393 (1994); David E. Shipley, Thin But Not Anorexic:
Copyright Protection for Compilations and Other Fact Works, 15 J. INTELL. PROP. 91
(2007); Marc K. Temin, The Irrelevance of Creativity: Feist’s Wrong Turn and the Scope of
Copyright Protection for Factual Works, 111 PENN ST. L. REV. 263 (2006); Alfred C. Yen,
The Legacy of Feist: Consequences of the Weak Connection Between Copyright and the
Economics of Public Goods, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 1343 (1991).
16
See, e.g., Ginsburg, supra note 15, at 353; Hughes, supra note 15, at 92;
Karjala, Copyright and Creativity, supra note 15, at 182.
17
See, e.g., Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, The Freedom to Copy: Copyright,
Creation, and Context, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 477 (2007); Ralph D. Clifford, Random
Numbers, Chaos Theory, and Cogitation: A Search for the Minimal Creativity Standard
in Copyright Law, 82 DENV. U. L. REV. 259 (2004); Robert A. Gorman, Copyright Courts
and Aesthetic Judgments: Abuse or Necessity?, 25 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 1 (2001);
Harrison, supra note 10; Madison, supra note 10; Miller, supra note 10; Gideon
Parchomovsky & Alex Stein, Originality, 95 VA. L. REV. 1505 (2009); Russ VerSteeg,
Rethinking Originality, 34 WM. & MARY L. REV. 801 (1993); Diane Leenheer
Zimmerman, It’s an Original!(?): In Pursuit of Copyright’s Elusive Essence, 28 COLUM.
J.L. & ARTS 187 (2005).
18
Gorman, supra note 17, at 3; see also Mitch Tuchman, Inauthentic Works of
Art: Why Bridgeman May Ultimately Be Irrelevant to Art Museums, 24 COLUM.-VLA J.L.
& ARTS 287, 304 (2001). For a lyrical approach to the white pages qua book, see Lizzie
Widdicombe, Endangered Species In The Book, NEW YORKER, Sept. 13, 2010, at 22-23.
19
See Harrison, supra note 10, at 859; Miller, supra note 10, at 463-64;
Parchomovsky & Stein, supra note 17, at 1506; Zimmerman, supra note 17, at 205-06;
cf. Madison, supra note 10, at 830 (noting creativity’s weak role at policing entry to
copyright protection and favoring a reformulated copyright policy aimed at enhancing
knowledge). To be sure, there is overlap between the concerns of the two groups of
scholars mentioned. Professor Dennis Karjala, for example, also has expressed concern
that too many fact-driven works may be granted copyright protection even though they
are more appropriate candidates either for patent protection or for no protection at all.
See Karjala, Copyright and Creativity, supra note 15, at 185-87.
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lead to an under- or oversupply of works in this medium, is not
readily accomplished. Photography has always walked a fine
line between “merely” reflecting reality and reflecting artistic
imprint.20 “Daguerreotypemania,” for example, captured public
attention through its ability to provide portraiture at a level of
exacting detail beyond anything previously imaginable.21 At the
same time, many of the first photographers were former
painters whose richly stylized work was seen as reflecting
artistic sensibilities.22 Even the Supreme Court’s seminal
photography decision of 1884, Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v.
Sarony, potentially set up a dichotomy between “graceful”
photographs, which would be protected under copyright, and
those in which “accuracy” was the “highest merit,” which might
not be.23 A tension is also apparent in today’s world, where
precise digital imaging is relied upon to perform surgery
safely.24 At the same time, modern digital photography clearly
has opened up many new avenues for creativity. Indeed, some
commentators argue that it is digital photography’s extreme
susceptibility to creative manipulation, rather than its
reflection of reality, that will come to be its hallmark.25
20

This vast topic, including the dual development of photography as an art
form and as evidence in court proceedings, has been addressed comprehensively by
others. See, e.g., Christine Haight Farley, The Lingering Effects of Copyright’s Response
to the Invention of Photography, 65 U. PITT. L. REV. 385, 389 (2004); Jennifer L.
Mnookin, The Image of Truth: Photographic Evidence and the Power of Analogy, 10
YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1, 14 (1998); Jessica M. Silbey, Filmmaking in the Precinct House
and the Genre of Documentary Film, 29 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 107, 110-11 (2005). In his
treatment of issues relating to fact-driven works, Professor Gorman evidently saw fit to
categorize photographs in that group. Gorman, supra note 9, at 1594-1600.
21
JOHN TAGG, THE BURDEN OF REPRESENTATION: ESSAYS ON PHOTOGRAPHIES
AND HISTORIES 42-43 (1993).
22
Walter Benjamin, Little History of Photography, in THE WORK OF ART IN
THE AGE OF ITS TECHNOLOGICAL REPRODUCIBILITY AND OTHER WRITINGS ON MEDIA
274, 281 (Michael W. Jennings et al. eds., Edmund Jephcott et al. trans., Belknap
Press of Harvard Univ. Press 2008); MARIA MORRIS HAMBOURG ET AL., THE WAKING
DREAM: PHOTOGRAPHY’S FIRST CENTURY 44-45 (1993); TAGG, supra note 21, at 45.
Somewhat contradictorily, Benjamin says of the miniaturists-turned-photographers both
that “the experience of their original livelihood stood them in good stead” and that “it is
not their artistic background so much as their training as craftsman that we have to
thank for the high level of their photographic achievement.” Benjamin, supra, at 281.
23
111 U.S. 53, 59 (1884).
24
The charge-coupled device, whose inventors were awarded the Nobel Prize in
Physics in 2009, advanced immeasurably the fields of astronomy and medicine by
enabling the digital imaging of both outer space and the human body. ROYAL SWEDISH
ACAD. OF SCI., SCIENTIFIC BACKGROUND ON THE NOBEL PRIZE IN PHYSICS 2009: TWO
REVOLUTIONARY OPTICAL TECHNOLOGIES 12-14 (2009), available at http://nobelprize.
org/nobel_prizes/physics/laureates/2009/sci.html.
25
See, e.g., FRED RITCHIN, AFTER PHOTOGRAPHY 58 (2009) (“In the digital
arena one cannot with any certainty look at a photograph and say, ‘So that is how it
was.’”); Raphael Winick, Intellectual Property, Defamation and the Digital Alteration of
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On a practical level, however, photographs have been
treated, in the vast majority of litigated copyright cases, as
works of authorship that easily clear the originality threshold
outlined by Feist. This tradition of near-presumptive copyright
protection exists despite the fact that it is difficult in today’s
environment to envision a market failure—a condition
justifying copyright for some commentators—with respect to
the creation of photographs; they are being produced in
droves.26 It also exists despite the fact that, as a doctrinal matter,
Feist seems to rule out assertions of creativity that are couched
in “practically inevitable” decision making, such as the
alphabetical arrangement of white page listings.27 Theoretically,
then, a snapshot reflecting the sole authorial input of instructing
a group of subjects to gather closely and say “cheese” might fail
Feist’s creativity requirement. Not surprisingly, however, the
disputes that have fleshed out the requirements for
photographic copyright have arisen over professional images,28
which traditionally have involved a more sophisticated web of
economic stimuli and authorial decision making than the
average snapshot. The courts adjudicating these cases often
seem driven by the desire to protect copyright plaintiffs from
outright copying by competitors or former clients and frequently
do not provide a persuasive explanation of what makes a

Visual Images, 21 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 143, 150 (1997) (remarking that “never
before has a palette of techniques existed with the variety and power now provided by
the computer” by which to modify visual images); Zachariah B. Parry, Note, Digital
Manipulation and Photographic Evidence: Defrauding the Courts One Thousand Words
at a Time, 2009 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 175, 176; Karen D. Williams, Comment,
Disparity in Copyright Protection: Focus on the Finished Image Ignores the Art in the
Details, 58 AM. U. L. REV. 169, 172 (2008) (“With advances in design and photography
software, the lines between photography and graphic design are blurring.”).
26
Indeed, it is difficult to overstate the ubiquity of photographic equipment and
images. In 2007, some 250 billion digital photographs were said to have been taken and
nearly one billion camera phones used. RITCHIN, supra note 25, at 11. In fact, despite the
vast differences separating the oldest and the most cutting-edge forms of photography,
both rapidly became available to the masses. See, e.g., RICHARD CHALFEN, SNAPSHOT
VERSIONS OF LIFE 71 (1987) (discussing nineteenth century expansion); Farley, supra
note 20, at 427 (same); Mnookin, supra note 20, at 12 (same).
27
Feist Publ’ns v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 363 (1991).
28
It is true that the case adjudicating the copyright dispute arising out of the
amateur filming of the J.F.K. assassination, Time Inc. v. Bernard Geis, 293 F. Supp.
130 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), has been influential in the development of photography copyright
doctrine, but it is a highly unusual case. So far, the typical swapping of images among
friends has not resulted in a discrete body of copyright jurisprudence. See John
Tehranian, Infringement Nation: Copyright Reform and The Law/Norm Gap, 2007 UTAH
L. REV. 537, 545 (describing typical unthinking, unlitigated sharing of amateur
photographs); cf. Tim Wu, Tolerated Use, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 617, 619-20 (2008)
(discussing prevalence of tolerated use and implicitly licensed use of copyrighted works).
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litigated photograph original and hence protectable (an omission
that is not unique to photography decisions).
Drawing upon the abundant stock of originality
jurisprudence in the area of photography, this article argues
that courts are ultimately doomed to fail in the quest to
explain, in a satisfying way, how a work of authorship is
original in and of itself. Caught between the impermissibility of
relying upon aesthetic virtues, on the one hand, and the degree
of effort expended by an author, on the other,29 the closest
courts can come to identifying originality, at least under the
current copyright framework, is through proxies for the legal
concept. Building upon the use of the proxy device by others in
intellectual property scholarship,30 this article identifies three
that serve this function: the proxy of ontology, the proxy of
narrative, and the proxy of comparison.
The proxy of ontology reflects the reliance by courts on a
work’s existence as a photograph as the basis for their
originality determinations. This proxy is the most suspect
under Feist because it implies that an image is original merely
if it is not a copy31 and sidesteps the creativity requirement.
The proxy of narrative refers to the courts’ use of authorial
29

See infra Part I.
Several scholars have invoked the proxy device as a means of describing
various aspects of the workings of intellectual property law, even if they have not all
employed the particular term. See, e.g., Amy B. Cohen, Copyright Law and the Myth of
Objectivity: The Idea-Expression Dichotomy and the Inevitability of Artistic Value
Judgments, 66 IND. L.J. 175, 216, 219-20 (1990) (identifying the judge’s “personal
reaction” to the works, their relative commercial success, and the reputation of the
creators as proxies for judicial idea/expression determinations); Christine Haight
Farley, Judging Art, 79 TUL. L. REV. 805, 845-49 (2005) (arguing that judicial
intuitions have guided judges’ analysis on aesthetic issues); Jessica Litman, The Public
Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965, 1001-02, 1004 (1990) (discussing reliance by courts on
burden allocation to avoid thorny originality determinations); Clarisa Long,
Information Costs in Patent and Copyright, 90 VA. L. REV. 465, 482-95 (2004)
(discussing proxies for identifying the protected features of an intellectual good);
Madison, supra note 10, at 822 (arguing that, in light of the low creativity threshold,
the “who?” of copyright is asked rather than the “what?”—that is, the content); Alfred
C. Yen, Copyright Opinions and Aesthetic Theory, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 247, 268, 273-74
(1998) (showing how courts’ reasoning in ways that parallel aesthetic theory has served
as proxy for originality determinations); see also Raymond Shih Ray Ku et al., Does
Copyright Law Promote Creativity? An Empirical Analysis of Copyright’s Bounty, 62
VAND. L. REV. 1669 (2009). Using copyright registration as a proxy for the creation of
works, the authors of the latter study conclude that a rise in population, rather than
the incentives afforded by the expansion of copyright protection, best accounts for the
increase in the number of works documented. Id. at 1673-74.
31
See, e.g., Schrock v. Learning Curve Int’l, Inc., 586 F.3d 513, 519 (7th Cir.
2009); Ets-Hokin v. Skyy Spirits, Inc., 225 F.3d 1068, 1076-77 (9th Cir. 2000)
(subsequent history omitted); Ets-Hokin, 225 F.3d at 1083 n.2 (Nelson, J., dissenting);
see also 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.08[E][2].
30
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narrative submitted by copyright plaintiffs to identify
originality. Through this method, a court translates a visual
work into text, a medium in which it more comfortably
operates.32 The proxy of comparison reflects the way in which
courts attempt to identify originality by comparing a litigated
image to others, which have often been submitted by the
parties. This method of relying on a visual comparison to
assess a visual work arguably comes closest to grounding an
originality determination in the image itself.33
Given the courts’ inability to reach originality in an
unmediated fashion, the current originality threshold, which is
low, should be left intact and the problematic aspects of
copyright’s expansiveness should be checked at other points. In
contrast to scholars who argue that raising the threshold would
lead to the production of more highly creative works, this
article submits that such a modification would likely result in
greater manipulation of the proxies, determinations based on
judicial subjectivity, and/or undesirable distortions of behavior
to comply with a legal rule. Finally, the article leaves off with
the question of whether, to the extent raising the originality
threshold would rule out copyright protection for images such
as the Obama Photograph, such a move should be considered in
light of the structure of American copyright and the ways in
which industries may have organized themselves around that
structure. Specifically, a move to withdraw protection from
“low originality” works might actually impair “high creative”
output where the low originality works serve as a kind of crosssubsidy for the creative endeavors, it is hoped, authors will
undertake over the course of their careers.
This article proceeds in three Parts. In Part I, it
discusses the originality standards that furnish the basis for
judicial assessments of originality today. This Part traces the
origins of the proxy approach to originality. In Part II, the
article sets forth the contemporary legal settings in which
questions about originality in photography typically arise—
copyright infringement suits over commercial photographs.
This Part develops the three proxies, described above, which
function as methods for making originality determinations.
Finally, Part III draws upon the standards and cases discussed in
32

See generally Rebecca Tushnet, Worth a Thousand Words: The Images of
Copyright Law, HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming Jan. 2012).
33
As will be discussed, a variation on this proxy exists where the relevant
comparison is between an image and its depicted subject matter. See infra Part II.D.2.
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the foregoing Parts to draw conclusions and raise questions about
how the originality doctrine should be applied to photography and
other “artistic” works. Diverging from recent proposals in the
scholarly literature, the article argues against a heightened
burden of proof for originality in works of authorship.
I.

PRINCIPLES OF ORIGINALITY AND ORIGINS OF PROXIES

As the latest word on originality from the Court, Feist
stands as a prism through which its earlier jurisprudence is to
be interpreted. But it is unclear how the originality doctrine in
Feist—and in particular, the “minimal degree of creativity”
component—should be applied outside the context of that case.
Did the Court intend creativity to be descriptive with respect to
certain works—that is, as an explanation of why, in contrast to
some fact-driven compilations, traditional works of art are
protected by copyright? Or was the creativity requirement
meant to be prescriptive—that is, intended to subject all works,
at least at the margins, to some meaningful scrutiny? If the
latter, what might such scrutiny entail? In addressing these
questions, it is necessary to consider how originality was
assessed prior to, and in, the Feist opinion.
A.

Legal Roots of Originality and Proxies

The Copyright Act of 1976, as amended, protects
“original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of
expression” but provides no definition of the term “original.”34
Discerning both statutory and constitutional imperatives, the
Court in Feist held that copyright protection turns on the
presence of originality.35 In arriving at this conclusion, the
Court cited a few seminal precedents, the earliest of which had
referenced originality and creativity elements. The Trade-Mark
Cases held that liability for trademark infringement could not
be grounded in the constitutional clause protecting copyrights
and patents36 because protectable “[w]ritings” must be
34

17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006).
It has been widely noted that the Constitution does not use the term
“original.” See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (granting Congress the power “To promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries”).
Nevertheless, the Court explicitly determined that “[o]riginality is a constitutional
requirement.” Feist Publ’ns v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 346 (1991).
36
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
35
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“original,” “the fruits of intellectual labor,” and “founded in the
creative powers of the mind,” and none of those criteria was
required for a protectable trademark.37 While originality and
creativity were thus explicitly mentioned, the concepts were
not explored in great depth and were defined primarily in
opposition to the supposedly mundane activity, in the Court’s
view, of appropriating a symbol as a trademark.
Five years later, in Burrow-Giles, the Court offered its
first affirmative account of originality in the copyright sense
when it assessed whether the extension of federal copyright
protection to photographs was constitutional.38 With respect to
general qualifications, the Court determined that authorial
status could be bestowed upon one “to whom anything owes its
origin; originator; maker; one who completes a work of science
or literature.”39 Likewise, protectable writings could “include all
forms of writing, printing, engraving, etching, [etc.], by which
the ideas in the mind of the author are given visible
expression.”40 From these principles, the Court reasoned that
the Constitution could “cover an act authorizing copyright of
photographs, so far as they are representatives of original
intellectual conceptions of the author.”41
With respect to the particular photograph at issue, the
Oscar Wilde, No. 18 photograph, the Court accepted the lower
court’s finding that it was a
useful, new, harmonious, characteristic, and graceful picture, and that
plaintiff made the same . . . entirely from his own original mental
conception, to which he gave visible form by posing the said Oscar
Wilde in front of the camera, selecting and arranging the costume,
draperies, and other various accessories in said photograph, arranging
the subject so as to present graceful outlines, arranging and disposing
the light and shade, suggesting and evoking the desired expression,
and from such disposition, arrangement, or representation, made
entirely by plaintiff, he produced the picture in suit.42

Accordingly, the photograph qualified as a constitutionally
cognizable writing and Napoleon Sarony, its prominent
37

Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 94 (1879).
111 U.S. 53 (1884).
39
Id. at 57-58; see also Feist, 499 U.S. at 346.
40
Burrow-Giles, 111 U.S. at 58.
41
Id. In yet another formulation, the Court similarly stated that in seeking
copyright protection for a “writing,” it was important to prove “those facts of
originality, of intellectual production, of thought, and conception on the part of the
author.” Id. at 60.
42
Id.
38
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photographer,43 qualified as a constitutionally recognized
author.44 The photograph merited copyright protection.

The Oscar Wilde, No. 18 photograph,
Copyright 1882, by N. Sarony
Courtesy of the Library of Congress

43

Sarony’s prominence was such that, a few years after the Burrow-Giles
litigation, on February 4, 1890, he photographed the Justices on the occasion of the
100th anniversary of the Judiciary. According to available sources, Sarony was the only
photographer to photograph that particular group of Justices, who sat together a
relatively short period of time. E-mail from Franz Jantzen, Collections Manager, Office
of the Curator, Supreme Court of the United States, to author (Jan. 10, 2011, 14:16
EST) (on file with author); accord Farley, supra note 20, at 406 & n.69; Tuchman,
supra note 18, at 299 & n.65.
44
Burrow-Giles, 111 U.S. at 58. Professor Christine Haight Farley notes that
Sarony regularly worked with a cameraman, Benjamin Richardson, and that it is quite
likely that Richardson was the person who pressed the shutter button and made other
technical choices. Farley, supra note 20, at 434-35.
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The Court’s unqualified adoption of this elaborate
description appears to reflect a full engagement with the
contents of the photograph. Indeed, the artistic choices
delineated in the description, including those with respect to
composition, lighting, angle, and shading, have informed
judicial analyses of photographs ever since.45 Professor
Christine Haight Farley has argued, however, that while
ostensibly listing the attributes of the Oscar Wilde, No. 18
photograph that render it an original, authored work, the
Court in fact located authorship in the figure of the Romantic
author—the photographer—who made “pre-shutter” decisions
about the arrangement of the subject and scene.46 She notes that
most of the attributes praised by the Court are not qualities of
the photograph per se, but rather, they constitute a running
narrative of the artistic activities undertaken by the
photographer in setting up the photograph.47 Thus, she contends
that the Court found authorship in photographic practice above
photographic product, thereby supporting a view of photography
in which a “photograph is simply a duplication of nature unless
it is actively constructed” by the practices delineated.48
One could argue, contrary to Farley, that by describing
the photograph as “useful, new, harmonious, characteristic,
and graceful,” the Court was attempting to lodge originality
within the four corners of the image.49 Farley herself
acknowledges the Court’s use of those descriptive words, but
she attempts to dispel any meaningful effect they might have
as a direct evaluation of the photograph by maintaining that
the Court merely stated, without explaining, what made the
45

E.g., Schrock v. Learning Curve Int’l, Inc., 586 F.3d 513, 519 (7th Cir.
2009); Ets-Hokin v. Skyy Spirits Inc., 225 F.3d 1068, 1076-77 (9th Cir. 2000)
(subsequent history omitted); Mannion v. Coors Brewing Co., 377 F. Supp. 2d 444, 45052 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
46
Farley, supra note 20, at 390-91, 431-32. Accord JANE M. GAINES,
CONTESTED CULTURE: THE IMAGE, THE VOICE, AND THE LAW 69 (1991) (“Since
personality cannot mix and mingle or flow through the machine in any way, it must
make its mark without touching.”).
47
Farley, supra note 20, at 427-29. This view contrasts with Professor Joseph
Miller’s characterization of the Court’s analysis as a “work-centered” creativity inquiry.
Miller, supra note 10, at 475-76.
48
Farley, supra note 20, at 432. Accordingly, she reasons that, for the Court,
the default position of photography was that it is authorless absent some “authorial
intervention.” Id.; cf. GAINES, supra note 46, at 47 (quoting French scholar Bernard
Edelman’s argument that intellectually appropriating a landscape scene requires the
photographer to produce it rather than reproduce it).
49
See, e.g., Yen, supra note 31, at 247, 268, 273-74 (arguing that the Court
invoked both formalist and intentionalist theories in assessing the Oscar Wilde, No. 18
photograph); infra note 56 (describing these theories).
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photograph “harmonious” or “original.”50 Farley is correct that
the Court did not define these terms in a generally applicable—
or textual—way, but the Court arguably did provide a concrete
definition by applying the descriptive terms to the photograph
itself—that is, it defined them through a visual explanation.51
However, the strength of this latter reading of the
Court’s analysis is undercut, at least to some degree, by
another aspect Farley identifies: that the Court’s elegant
pronouncement (set out in the block quote above) did not draw
upon words of its own. The very language originated not with
the Court or the lower court but almost word for word from
Sarony himself (or likely his counsel).52 Thus, as seemingly
descriptive as the language of the decision might appear when
held up to the image itself, the Burrow-Giles Court in the end
relied upon a proxy for the qualities of originality it clearly
viewed the photograph as possessing—not only in the form of
emphasis on authorial practice, but at a more fundamental
level, in the form of authorial account of authorial practice.53 It
suggested, in effect, that a court may deem a work original if a
persuasive narrative of authorship that “owes its origin” to an
author is presented.
The Court’s narrative approach to originality is also
observable in the portion of the opinion in which it withheld
judgment about the extension of federal copyright protection to
all photographs. Specifically, the Court declined to address
whether copyright would apply to the “ordinary production of a
50

Farley, supra note 20, at 431-32.
Unlike many photography cases today, the Oscar Wilde, No. 18 photograph
was not appended to the Burrow-Giles opinion. It is an interesting thought experiment
to imagine how the precedential effect of a case might change depending on whether a
subsequent court sees or does not see a litigated photograph along with the written
opinion adjudging it. For a critique of the Supreme Court’s later use of appended
images in its opinions, see Hampton Dellinger, Commentary, Words Are Enough: The
Troublesome Use of Photographs, Maps, and Other Images in Supreme Court Opinions,
110 HARV. L. REV. 1704 (1997).
52
Farley, supra note 20, at 411 & n.92, 438, 455. Professor Farley identifies
Sarony’s brief as the source of the language. In fact, the origin of the language can be
traced back further still, nearly word for word, to Sarony’s complaint in the lower
court. See Transcript of Record at 4, 6-7, Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111
U.S. 53 (1884) (No. 1071) (setting out the complaint in the Circuit Court for the
Southern District of New York). The language appears in the second paragraph of each
of Sarony’s causes of action. Id. While it is not uncommon for courts to adopt litigants’
language, this mode of analysis set the stage in originality decisions for close reliance
on a plaintiff’s authorship narrative. See infra Part II.C.
53
Farley, supra note 20, at 426, 432; see also ROBERTA ROSENTHAL KWALL,
THE SOUL OF CREATIVITY 81 (2010) (“According to the Court, although authorship was
evident in the photograph itself, the narrative supplied by the photographer was vital
in assisting the Court’s perception.”).
51
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photograph” wherein “[i]t is simply the manual operation, by
the use of . . . instruments and preparations, of transferring to
the plate the visible representation of some existing object, the
accuracy of this representation being its highest merit.”54 The
Court did not provide guidelines for determining when a
photograph might cease to be an “original intellectual
conception” and fall into the “ordinary production” category—
which might or might not warrant protection—other than to
caution against employing too strong an authorial emphasis on
photographic accuracy in litigation documents.55 But this
distinction, particularly in a highly representational medium
like photography, would usually need to occur at the level of
narrative presented to a court, rather than at the level of the
formal properties of the image.56
Although the Court’s reasoning in a subsequent visual
arts decision, Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co.,57 is often
seen as a divergence from Burrow-Giles,58 it is in some ways a
natural extension of the earlier case. In Bleistein, the Court
addressed an infringement action in which chromolithographic
posters advertising a circus had been copied. The Court, through
Justice Holmes, emphasized “the personal reaction of an
individual upon nature” and the conviction that “[p]ersonality

54

Burrow-Giles, 111 U.S. at 59; accord Thornton v. Schreiber, 124 U.S. 612,
613 (1888) (“As we have heretofore decided in the case of [Burrow-Giles], photographs
are included, under certain circumstances, among the things which may be
copyrighted.” (emphasis added)).
55
As discussed infra Part II, the question of this emphasis would become a
touchstone for originality debates in photography cases. See Bridgeman Art Library,
Ltd. v. Corel Corp., 36 F. Supp. 2d 191, 197 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (plaintiff’s stated goal of
accuracy in depiction was fatal to claim). For another example of the lengths to which
copyright plaintiffs will go to emphasize a lack of intent to capture the underlying
subject accurately, see Schiffer Publ’g, Ltd., v. Chronicle Books, LLC, No. Civ.A. 034962, 2004 WL 2583817, at *8 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 12, 2004) (in finding originality, relying
upon evidence that photographers “did not attempt to replicate fabric swatches as
precisely as possible,” that they rather “strove to create images that were visually
interesting,” and noting that “several photographers clearly stated that they never
compared the fabric swatches to their photographs, precisely because such a
comparison was unimportant to their goals”).
56
The distinction here is akin to that in aesthetic theory between an
intentionalist approach—where one considers the creator’s intention to create a work of
art—and formalist theories—where one considers the qualities within the four corners
of an image. See Farley, supra note 30, at 842-43; Yen, supra note 30, at 253-58.
57
188 U.S. 239 (1903). Note that Feist cites Bleistein just once, and not in the
section where it sets up the standards for originality. See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural
Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 359 (1991).
58
See Jewelers’ Circular Publ’g Co. v. Keystone Publ’g Co., 274 F. 932, 934
(S.D.N.Y. 1921) (subsequent history omitted); Farley, supra note 20, at 456 n.266;
Miller, supra note 10, at 475; Zimmerman, supra note 17, at 201.
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always contains something unique.”59 Thus, even a “very modest
grade of art has in it something irreducible, which is one man’s
alone” and “[t]hat something he may copyright” unless barred by
statute.60 The Court found the posters sufficiently original to
warrant copyright protection.
While one cannot help but be bemused by the parade of
great masters Holmes offers up in his quest to ensure the
protection of “works of little merit or of humble degree,”61 the
overwhelming thrust of the opinion is to open wide the door of
copyright to any work that reflects the imprint of personality.
Because this might include every work ever produced, the
opinion reduced, at least in theory, the role of copyright courts
as art critics.62 Importantly, whatever doubt remained after
Burrow-Giles as to the protectability of “ordinary” art was, in
the view of Judge Learned Hand, firmly and resoundingly
erased by Bleistein.63 The originality of a work under the
Bleistein paradigm could be equated with its having originated
with an author or, as Professor Diane Leenheer Zimmerman
phrases it, “if it is not copied, it is original.”64
Given Justice Holmes’ institutional commitment to
minimizing the role of courts in disputes over artistic merit, it
is perhaps not surprising that unlike the text of Burrow-Giles,
no part of the Bleistein opinion attempted to explain which
intrinsic aesthetic qualities of the posters rendered them
sufficiently original for copyright protection.65 Rather, Holmes
went out of his way to offer proxies for that determination:
that, as a default proposition, works of art contain the
“irreducible” imprint of individual “[p]ersonality”; that there
was “express testimony” as to the posters’ originality; that the
posters were copied by the defendant, reflecting their “worth.”66
As argued above, however, the use of these proxies in fact
reflects the jurisprudential approach taken in Burrow-Giles.
59

Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 250.
Id.
61
Id. at 249-51 (referencing Velasquez, Whistler, Rembrandt, Degas, Goya,
and Manet).
62
See id. at 250-52; see also Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, The Story of
Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Company: Originality as a Vehicle for Copyright
Inclusivity, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY STORIES 77, 96-99 (Jane C. Ginsburg &
Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss eds., 2006).
63
Jewelers’ Circular, 274 F. at 934; accord Gorman, supra note 9, at 1595;
Yen, supra note 30, at 271.
64
Zimmerman, supra note 17, at 202.
65
See Yen, supra note 30, at 273.
66
Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 250-52.
60
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That opinion’s reliance upon a proxy—in the form of wholesale
adoption of the plaintiff-author’s narrative—implicitly set the
stage for Bleistein, in which Justice Holmes could say a great
deal, but not much about the works at issue.67
In an influential pronouncement that both reflected68
and contributed to the liberal treatment of photographs under
copyright, Judge Hand extended Bleistein’s permissive stance
on originality to photographs. In the context of assessing
photographs of jewelers’ trademarks used to illustrate a trade
circular, he announced that “no photograph, however simple,
can be unaffected by the personal influence of the author, and
no two will be absolutely alike.”69 The relevant statute in that
case, the Copyright Act of 1909,70 was like our current statute
in that it protected photographs without further qualification
and, according to Hand, “[t]he suggestion that the Constitution
might not include all photographs seems . . . overstrained.”71 In
Judge Hand’s reasoning, accordingly, we see adoption of a
proxy based on ontology; it is a photograph, and therefore it is
original. The question thus presents itself: to what degree is
this notion still valid after Feist?72
B.

The Feist Opinion

In the years following Bleistein, the Court had occasion
to pronounce upon the originality of works before it,73 but it was
almost ninety years later that the Court re-engaged closely
with the topic in Feist. As mentioned, it deemed originality to
be both statutorily and constitutionally required for copyright
protection and as entailing (1) that a work be independently
67

The closest the opinion comes to making a judgment about the contents of
the posters is in its statement that “[t]here is no reason to doubt that these prints in
their ensemble and in all their details, in their design and particular combinations of
figures, lines, and colors, are the original work of the plaintiffs’ designer.” Id. at 250.
This language is fairly noncommittal and is certainly less specifically evaluative than
the effulgent language used by the Burrow-Giles Court.
68
See Farley, supra note 20, at 438-46, for a discussion of the ways in which
courts in the early aftermath of Burrow-Giles applied the decision.
69
See Jewelers’ Circular Publ’g Co. v. Keystone Publ’g Co., 274 F. 932, 934
(S.D.N.Y. 1921) (subsequent history omitted).
70
Pub. L. No. 60-349, § 5, 35 Stat. 1075, 1076-77 (repealed).
71
Jewelers’ Circular, 274 F. at 934-35.
72
Courts that have addressed this question understand Judge Hand’s
viewpoint to have been rejected by Feist. See Meshwerks, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales
U.S.A., Inc., 528 F.3d 1258, 1263 n.5 (10th Cir. 2008); Bridgeman Art Library, Ltd. v.
Corel Corp., 36 F. Supp. 2d 191, 196 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
73
See, e.g., Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 206-08 (1954).
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created (that is, not copied) by the author, and (2) that it
possess a modicum of creativity.74 The originality requirement
operates at two levels, both of which are of particular relevance
to photography litigation. First, in order to be eligible for
copyright protection at all, a work must be sufficiently original
when judged in gestalt fashion, as a whole greater than the
sum of its parts.75 Second, originality determines the scope of a
work’s protection. Unless the work has been copied outright in
its entirety, originality performs its heavy lifting at this second
level—that is, at the level of the work’s parts—since an author
may protect only the original elements of the work.76 An
author’s ability to obtain relief will depend upon a court’s
determination that what the second author has appropriated
are these original elements.77 As we will see, photography
litigation raises both kinds of claims.
With respect to the jurisprudential approach adopted in
Feist, it could be argued, on the one hand, that the Court
returned to, and therefore condoned, an attempt to engage
directly with the contents of the work presented to it. That is,
on a substantive, textual level, the Court freely characterizes
the listings as “garden-variety” and “typical,” among other
74

Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991).
Although further discussion is beyond the scope of this article, it should be noted that
determining whether a work is “not copied” raises difficult questions. Drawing on
theory developed in other academic disciplines, such as musicology and literary
criticism, a number of legal scholars have argued that the law does not sufficiently
reflect the complex interconnections and borrowings that have always existed, and been
encouraged, between texts. See, e.g., Arewa, supra note 17, at 520-44; Julie E. Cohen,
Creativity and Culture in Copyright Theory, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1151, 1176 (2007).
75
Cf. Boisson v. Banian, Ltd., 273 F.3d 262, 272 (2d Cir. 2001) (noting that
“original works broken down into their composite parts would usually be little more
than basic unprotectible elements like letters, colors and symbols”).
76
Feist, 499 U.S. at 348 (“The mere fact that a work is copyrighted does not
mean that every element of the work may be protected. . . . [C]opyright protection may
extend only to those components of a work that are original to the author.”); Cohen, supra
note 30, at 196 (“[T]he real value of the copyright in a given work is measured by the
scope of protection it provides to the copyright owner who claims that his or her copyright
in that work has been infringed.”); cf. Jeanne C. Fromer, Claiming Intellectual Property,
76 U. CHI. L. REV. 719, 721 (2009) (noting that the extent of copyright protection is
determined “only down the road in case-by-case infringement litigation”).
77
Feist set out the two principal elements of an infringement suit: “(1)
ownership of a valid copyright, and (2) copying of constituent elements of the work that
are original.” 499 U.S. at 361. As Professor Jane Ginsburg has pointed out, although
the Court granted certiorari in Feist to adjudicate the scope of protection for the listings,
id. at 342, the Court decided that the 1309 names, towns, and telephone numbers in the
plaintiff’s white pages were not copyrightable at all. Ginsburg, supra note 15, at 342, 349.
Accordingly, despite the fact that much copyright litigation occurs over the scope of
protection for a plaintiff’s work, Feist joined Burrow-Giles and Bleistein to create a
triumvirate of cases dealing with the threshold question of originality.
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things.78 On the other hand, this commentary is more
comparative than definitional and, in any event, is framed in
the negative, ruling out works as unoriginal rather than
providing an affirmative account of creativity.79
Feist does not provide substantive guidelines for its
creativity component, nor does it address how rigorously the
requirement should be applied to works of authorship for which
a well-developed jurisprudence already existed, as in the case
of photography.80 Did the creativity requirement mean that
photographs must now meet a higher (or lower81) burden in
obtaining copyright protection, or did the requirement codify
the existing liberal treatment of photography? The opinion
could be read to say that, as a descriptive matter, anything
that can be labeled as “art” inherently possesses the originality
that is lacking in phonebook-like works. After all, the opinion
flatly says that the “requisite level of creativity is extremely
low” and that the “vast majority of works” do “possess some
creative spark.”82 If the denominator for the “vast majority of
works” means all works of expression ever produced (rather
than in each medium), then these guidelines could be
understood to indicate that a work’s status as a non-fact-driven
work is a sufficient proxy for originality. In this way, the Feist
opinion hints at the proxy of ontology discussed below. By way
of a borrowed hypothetical from Judge Hand, the Court implies
as much by stating that a theoretical stumbling block for
protecting a familiar-sounding poem might be a novelty
problem, not an originality problem.83
Nevertheless, the Court’s use of unqualified language in
setting out the originality requirements strongly indicates that
some form of creativity scrutiny is meant, at least at the
78

Id. at 362.
See, e.g., Ginsburg, supra note 15, at 343; Justin Hughes, The Personality
Interest of Artists and Inventors in Intellectual Property, 16 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J.
81, 101 (1998); Miller, supra note 10, at 481. Of course, given its resolution of the case,
the failure to provide an affirmative account is not surprising.
80
Gorman, supra note 17, at 3.
81
Professor Douglas Lichtman points out that “[w]ithout discussion, the Feist
Court adopted the creativity interpretation—interestingly, adding that only a ‘minimal
degree’ of creativity is necessary, even though the Trade-Mark Cases opinion itself
contains no such qualifying language.” Lichtman, supra note 15, at 698.
82
Feist, 499 U.S. at 345.
83
Id. at 345-46 (“To illustrate, assume that two poets, each ignorant of the
other, compose identical poems. Neither work is novel, yet both are original and, hence,
copyrightable.” (citing Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 54 (2d
Cir. 1936))). The Court assumes counterfactually, for the purpose of this example, that
novelty is relevant to copyright.
79
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margins, to be applied to each work.84 Such a conclusion,
favoring a unified originality standard,85 is bolstered by the
Court’s reliance upon Burrow-Giles and Bleistein—precedents
grounded in the arts.
If the originality standard is applicable across the
board, then a method is required for interpreting the Court’s
implication that some works will, or indeed “must,” fail to
achieve copyright protection on originality grounds.86 These
statements, to be sure, are offered in the context of discussing
the protection for compilations, which raise a particular set of
considerations. Yet the opinion contains the unmistakable
theme that any type of work is theoretically open to challenge
so as to ensure the vibrancy and integrity of the copyright
regime even if, as Professor Zimmerman points out, the Court
did not specify what the overall goal of the originality
requirement is.87
Writing in the immediate aftermath of Feist, Professor
Russ VerSteeg expressed concern that the originality
assessment might call for a medical assessment of the subjective
processes engaged in by the author to see if they evidenced

84

The key statements are offered without reservation: the “sine qua non of
copyright is originality” and “[o]riginal, as the term is used in copyright” requires
independent creation and minimal creativity. Id. Professor Gorman accepts that Feist is
applicable to traditional art works and that it calls for “an assessment of the worth or
merit of a work.” Gorman, supra note 17, at 3. But, he urges that there be “very strong
reasons to withhold copyright protection from a work on account of its lack of creativity”
because the “vast majority of works” are original and injecting courts into “highly
subjective disputes” over aesthetic merits will constitutionalize routine copyright
disputes. Id. at 3-4.
85
See Ginsburg, supra note 15, at 341 (“The Court elected to impose a unitary
concept of creative originality and declared that the Constitution compels this standard.”).
86
The Court, for example, says that there “remains a narrow category of
works in which the creative spark is utterly lacking or so trivial as to be virtually
nonexistent,” Feist, 499 U.S. at 359, and that it is a “[g]iven that some works must fail”
on originality grounds, id. at 364; see also id. at 358 (noting, in the context of the
statutory definition of compilations, that “[n]ot every selection, coordination, or
arrangement will pass muster”). Indeed, the Court closes its opinion with the
unreserved view that “[a]s a constitutional matter, copyright protects only those
constituent elements of a work that possess more than a de minimis quantum of
creativity.” Id. at 363.
87
Zimmerman, supra note 17, at 206. Professor Diane Leenheer Zimmerman
is critical of Feist on this score, arguing that rather than providing an affirmative
theory of copyright, it only rules out potential theories that had been in the running.
The Court’s analysis precludes, for instance, a market failure theory, since it forecloses
copyright claims based on labor-intensive, “sweat of the brow” collections of facts—such
as compilations of white page listings—that possess undeniable social utility. Id.
Additionally, the Court in Feist rules out a pure liberty or rights-based theory of
copyright insofar as it prioritizes the public’s use of communicative works where only
an “infinitesimal” showing of individuality has been made. Id. at 208.
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sufficient creativity.88 More recently, drawing on neurobiological
research, Professor Ralph Clifford also has argued that the
“creative spark” is not the proper way to determine creative
output and that the “spark” requirement may be used to deny
copyright protection to sufficiently creative works.89
In practice, however, at least in the area of photography
litigation, courts have not overtly evaluated the internal
psychological processes engaged in by photographers.
Furthermore, the vast majority of works have been granted
threshold protection against copying.90 The next Part fleshes
out the proxies for originality that courts have utilized in
contemporary photography disputes.
II.

ORIGINALITY PROXIES IN CONTEMPORARY PHOTOGRAPHY
CASES

Skepticism about the degree of authorship required for
creating a photograph—a work capable of mass production that
is mediated by machine rather than human hand—has existed
since the dawn of the medium.91 As a legal matter, following the
Court’s decision in Burrow-Giles, virtually every litigated
photograph has been deemed original at the threshold level for
purposes of copyright protection.92 Cases challenging
photographs on originality grounds, however, have persisted.
These challenges were perhaps fated to reassert themselves in
the age of digital photography, with its ubiquitous presence in
contemporary culture and further attenuation of, as Walter
Benjamin phrased it, the “here and now” quality of an
original.93

88

See generally VerSteeg, supra note 17, at 840-43; see also Russ VerSteeg,
Sparks in the Tinderbox: Feist, “Creativity,” and the Legislative History of the 1976
Copyright Act, 56 U. PITT. L. REV. 549 (1995) (critiquing Feist’s creativity rule and
suggesting that Congress could overturn it).
89
Clifford, supra note 17, at 289.
90
See Madison, supra note 10, at 830, 851 (arguing that the creativity
component does not serve as a gatekeeper and critiquing the appropriateness of
internal investigations into creative processes).
91
See, e.g., Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53 (1884); cf.
WALTER BENJAMIN, The Work of Art in the Age of Its Technological Reproducibility, in
4 WALTER BENJAMIN: SELECTED WRITINGS, 1938-1940, at 251, 256 (Howard Eiland &
Michael W. Jennings eds., Edmund Jephcott et al. trans., Belknap Press of Harvard
University Press 2003) (“From a photographic plate . . . one can make any number of
prints; to ask for the ‘authentic’ print makes no sense.”).
92
See, e.g., Farley, supra note 20, at 438-39; Tuchman, supra note 18, at 299.
93
BENJAMIN, supra note 91, at 253.
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One might expect that the contests over originality in
photography would arise in connection to photojournalistic
works. For the “factual” nature of those sorts of photographs
might readily prompt arguments that protection of the images
would be tantamount to the protection of facts, in violation of
Feist.94 And, arguably, protection under the principles of
Burrow-Giles might prove less certain in this context since,
except in portraiture, a significant number of news
photographs do not emerge out of the orchestrated scenes that
Burrow-Giles blessed as “original.” To be sure, disputes do
occasionally arise out of photojournalistic images. Prior to
Fairey, a famous assessment of authorship involved frames
from the “citizen photojournalist” Abraham Zapruder’s film of
the John F. Kennedy assassination.95 The news-driven context
of those kinds of images, however, is usually considered later,
at the fair use stage, rather than in determining whether a
plaintiff’s photograph is original in the first place.96
The contemporary cases that continue to press
questions about originality and authorship in photography
arise in much less dramatic circumstances. This Part will first
provide an overview of these cases. It will then present proxies
that courts have used in making their determinations about
originality in photographs.
A.

Cases

The disputes in photography that cut to the core of the
originality doctrine commence over images of perfume bottles,97
hardware equipment components,98 electrical products,99 toy
94

See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 347 (1991); cf.
Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 254 (1918) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
(“The mere record of isolated happenings, whether in words or by photographs not
involving artistic skill, are denied such protection.”); Burrow-Giles, 111 U.S. at 59
(reserving judgment on accurate representations); 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 31,
§ 13.03[B][2][b] (“Liability likewise cannot arise to the extent that the similarity
between plaintiff’s and defendant’s work is that both graphically reproduce an object
exactly as it occurs in nature.” (footnotes omitted)).
95
See Time Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assocs., 293 F. Supp. 130 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
96
See, e.g., L.A. News Serv. v. KCAL-TV Channel 9, 108 F.3d 1119, 1121-22
(9th Cir. 1997) (considering footage of Reginald Denny beating); Bernard Geis, 293 F.
Supp. at 146; see also Collette Leland, All’s Fair in Love and News: How the Current
Application of the Fair Use Doctrine Favors the Traditional Media over Amateur
Content Providers, 8 WAKE FOREST INTELL. PROP. L.J. 226 (2008) (arguing that the
application of fair use disfavors the interests of non-news professionals).
97
FragranceNet.com, Inc. v. FragranceX.com, Inc., 679 F. Supp. 2d 312, 315
(E.D.N.Y. 2010).
98
Decker Inc. v. G & N Equip. Co., 438 F. Supp. 2d 734, 738 (E.D. Mich. 2006).
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trains,100 mirrored picture frames,101 Chinese food dishes,102 fabric
swatches,103 and the like. These types of images, often produced
for advertising or marketing purposes, feature products shot
close up, framed with little or no background, and with any
lighting and shading choices hard for the lay viewer to discern.
In some ways, the continued originality challenges are
surprising. After all, these photographs are often created under
the conditions addressed by the earlier Supreme Court
precedents. Consistent with Burrow-Giles, for example, the
subjects are photographed in controlled environments,104 in
which the photographer can make choices about lighting, focus,
and the other elements and has the opportunity to “evok[e] the
desired expression.”105 Likewise, the fact that the purpose of
these images is frequently to sell products should be no bar to
protection under the rule of Bleistein.106 Thus, originality in
these circumstances would seem premised comfortably upon
the rendering choices made (as to lighting, angle, etc.)107 and,
often, upon the arrangement of poses and scenery.108

99

E. Am. Trio Prods., Inc. v. Tang Elec. Corp., 97 F. Supp. 2d 395, 399
(S.D.N.Y. 2000).
100
Schrock v. Learning Curve Int’l, Inc., 586 F.3d 513, 516 (7th Cir. 2009).
101
SHL Imaging, Inc. v. Artisan House, Inc., 117 F. Supp. 2d 301, 303
(S.D.N.Y. 2000).
102
Oriental Art Printing, Inc. v. Goldstar Printing Corp., 175 F. Supp. 2d 542,
544 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (subsequent history omitted).
103
Schiffer Publ’g, Ltd., v. Chronicle Books, LLC, No. Civ.A. 03-4962, 2004
WL 2583817, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 12, 2004).
104
See, e.g., Latimer v. Roaring Toyz, Inc., 574 F. Supp. 2d 1265, 1269 (M.D.
Fla. 2008), aff’d in part and rev’d in part on other grounds, 601 F.3d 1224 (11th Cir.
2010); SHL Imaging, 117 F. Supp. 2d at 303. For an argument that much of
commercial photography requires merely stock lighting and set-up, see Patricia L.
Baade, Photographer’s Rights: Case for Sufficient Originality Test in Copyright Law, 30
J. MARSHALL L. REV. 149, 187 (1996).
105
Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 60 (1884).
106
Bleistein famously states that the fact that works have “a real use—if use
means to increase trade and to help to make money”—should not prohibit copyright
protection. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903). “A
picture is none the less a picture and none the less a subject of copyright that it is used
for an advertisement.” Id.
107
See, e.g., Schrock v. Learning Curve Int’l, Inc., 586 F.3d 513, 519-22 (7th Cir.
2009); FragranceNet.com, Inc. v. FragranceX.com, Inc., 679 F. Supp. 2d 312, 320-21
(E.D.N.Y. 2010); Masterson Mktg., Inc. v. Lotus Int’l, Inc., No. 04cv2133, 2008 WL
667412, at *6-7 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 7, 2008); Decker Inc. v. G & N Equip. Co., 438 F. Supp. 2d
734, 742 (E.D. Mich. 2006); SHL Imaging, 117 F. Supp. 2d at 311; E. Am. Trio Prods., Inc.
v. Tang Elec. Corp., 97 F. Supp. 2d 395, 417-18 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); Epic Metals Corp. v.
Condec, Inc., 867 F. Supp. 1009, 1013 (M.D. Fla. 1994).
108
See, e.g., Mannion v. Coors Brewing Co., 377 F. Supp. 2d 444, 455
(S.D.N.Y. 2005); Fournier v. Erickson, 202 F. Supp. 2d 290, 297 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
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Nevertheless, cases continue to challenge these sorts of
photographs on originality grounds. Courts, for the most part,
are reluctant to deny copyrightability in the context in which
these challenges are typically raised—as defenses to allegations
of copying by a competitor or by a former client of the copyright
holder.109 However, these courts often do not ground their
decisions in any developed, articulated theory of originality.
The Ninth Circuit, for example, discussed both the
traditional criteria for originality in photography and the Feist
criteria in Ets-Hokin v. Skyy Spirits, Inc., in which it assessed
photographs of the blue Skyy vodka bottle.110 Some language
used by the court initially appears to imply that, by interacting
with one another, these criteria produce an originality
requirement for photography that is doubly low: “When [Feist’s]
articulation of the minimal threshold for copyright protection is
combined with the minimal standard of originality required for
photographic works, the result is that even the slightest
artistic touch will meet the originality test for a photograph.”111
However, the court did not pursue a fine-tuned analysis
of how the Feist standard bears on the traditional approach;
rather, it simply drew upon the earlier photography cases to
supply the content for Feist’s modicum of creativity
requirement.112 Thus, it referred to Judge Hand’s
pronouncement about the personality-imbued medium, and
also to its own precedent, which provided that the “selection of
subject, posture, background, lighting, and perhaps even
perspective alone [may function] as protectable elements of a
photographer’s work” so as to render a photograph
copyrightable.113 Accordingly, the court articulated a view under
which Feist’s modicum of creativity requirement codifies the
prior judicial treatment of photography. It stopped short of
109

Consistent with Professor Justin Hughes’ analysis, courts’ protection of the
targets of free riding—corporate entity and individual photographer alike—appears to
undermine a notion that they are consumed solely by a concern for the Romantic
author. See Hughes, supra note 79, at 120-21. Separately, while Professor Stewart
Sterk is surely correct in his intuition that market forces encourage creative risktaking by photographers, see Stewart E. Sterk, Rhetoric and Reality in Copyright Law,
94 MICH. L. REV. 1197, 1214 (1996), the frequency of fallouts between photographers
and their clients suggests that the interests of the two groups are not always aligned
and that copyright protection may play a role as an incentive. See infra Part III.B.1.
110
225 F.3d 1068, 1071 (9th Cir. 2000), aff’d after remand, 323 F.3d 763 (9th
Cir. 2003).
111
Id. at 1076.
112
Id. at 1076-77.
113
Id. at 1077 (quoting L.A. News Serv. v. Tullo, 973 F.2d 791, 794 (9th Cir.
1992) and United States v. Hamilton, 583 F.2d 448, 452 (9th Cir. 1978)).
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stating affirmatively that all photographs will manifest the
requisite creativity, but to the extent that it all but approves
the potential authorial contribution of “perspective alone,” the
decision would seem to suggest that every photograph is likely
to qualify for protection, since every photograph entails some
choice of perspective.114
In Mannion v. Coors Brewing Co., Judge Lewis Kaplan,
who has written a number of important photography decisions,
attempted to grapple directly with the ways in which a
photograph might be examined for originality following Feist.115
First, he drew on familiar principles to proclaim that a
photograph may display originality in the rendition, which
relates to the way in which a subject is depicted through choice
of angle, lighting, shading, filter, exposure, developing
technique, and the like.116 In an influential statement, he
declared that “[u]nless a photograph replicates another work
with total or near-total fidelity, it will be at least somewhat
original in the rendition.”117 Next is originality in the timing,
which relates to the capturing of an event by being at the right
place at the right time.118 Third is originality in the creation of
the subject, which relates to the planning, conception, and
arrangement of the photographic scene.119
114

Dan Hunter & F. Gregory Lastowka, Amateur-To-Amateur, 46 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 951, 963 (2004) (“Of course, any given photograph must
demonstrate . . . selection and [personal] influence [through temporal and spatial
framing], even if the intent of the photographer is simply to capture factual
information, not to express an artistic vision. Selection is inherent in the technology;
one cannot take a picture of everything.”).
115
377 F. Supp. 2d 444, 450-54 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). These ways are not mutually
exclusive. Id. at 452.
116
Id. (citing 1 HON. SIR HUGH LADDIE ET AL., THE MODERN LAW OF
COPYRIGHT AND DESIGNS § 4.57, at 229 (3d ed. Butterworths 2000)). Judge Kaplan
acknowledged that his analysis primarily addressed itself to traditional print
photography and not digital photography, which “may or may not demand a different
analytical framework.” Id. at 454 n.65.
117
Id. at 452. The Nimmer treatise agrees with this general statement of the
case law. See 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 31, § 2.08[E][1] (“[A]ny (or . . . almost
any) photograph may claim the necessary originality to support a copyright merely by
virtue of the photographers’ personal choice of subject matter, angle of photograph,
lighting, and determination of the precise time when the photograph is to be taken.”).
118
Mannion, 377 F. Supp. 2d at 452-53. An example is Alfred Eisenstaedt’s
famous photograph of a VJ Day kiss in Times Square. Id. at 453.
119
Id. at 453-54. Examples of this form of originality are found in Rogers v.
Koons, 960 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1992), and Gross v. Seligman, 212 F. 930 (2d Cir. 1914), in
which the photographers’ “creation” of their respective subjects, a couple holding eight
puppies and a nude model in a particular pose, were protected from subsequent
reworking. Mannion, 377 F. Supp. 2d at 453-54. The Oscar Wilde, No. 18 photograph
itself would likely qualify for rendering and subject matter originality under Judge
Kaplan’s taxonomy, since the Supreme Court noted the particular posing and arranging
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Judge Kaplan’s metrics are useful in probing which
aspects of a photograph might make it worthy of copyright
protection. He goes further, however, and maintains that
courts should use them as a way of focusing on the “originality
of the final product”—that is, the photograph itself—rather
than the decisions that went into creating it.120 This move in
favor of establishing originality within the four corners of an
image highlights the absence of guidance as to the substantive
content of originality from either Congress or the Supreme
Court. As mentioned, the Court has noted that the quantum of
originality required is low, and it has made statements about
what is not required: artistic merit, novelty, or any appreciable
effort.121 Accordingly, in the absence of specific guidance, courts
have adopted proxies for their originality determinations, some
of which are valid and some of which are in tension with the
reasoning of Feist. These proxies are the proxy of ontology, the
proxy of narrative, and the proxy of comparison.
Before moving on to describe the proxies, a brief word
must be said about burdens of proof. In this article, originality
is discussed in terms of a determination a court makes. This
shorthand elides the important point that, by statute, a
certificate of registration will generally constitute prima facie
evidence of the validity of the copyright, including proof of the
work’s originality.122 Thus, as a matter of burden allocation, it
falls to the defendant challenging a work to rebut the
presumption of a work’s originality. Defendants sometimes
attempt to meet this burden by providing evidence that the
plaintiff has copied from some prior source, and for that reason,
decisions made by Sarony with respect to the subject, costume, draperies, and accessories,
including even the expression that Sarony had “suggest[ed]” and “evok[ed]” from Oscar
Wilde. See Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 60 (1884).
120
Mannion, 377 F. Supp. 2d at 451. It has been argued that Feist left unclear
whether the overarching originality inquiry was into the work itself or the process by
which it was created. See, e.g., Raskind, supra note 15, at 334. Courts do elide the
difference between product and production. In Southco, Inc. v. Kanebridge Corp., the
court described the Oscar Wilde, No. 18 photograph as a “not ‘ordinary’ photo.” 390
F.3d 276, 284 (3d Cir. 2004) (en banc). By contrast, the Burrow-Giles Court had
distinguished that photograph’s creation from the “ordinary production of a
photograph.” Burrow-Giles, 111 U.S. at 59 (emphasis added).
121
Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345, 358-60 (1991);
Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 250 (1903).
122
17 U.S.C. § 410(c) (2006); see, e.g., Johnson v. Gordon, 409 F.3d 12, 17 (1st
Cir. 2005); Boisson v. Banian, Ltd., 273 F.3d 262, 268 (2d Cir. 2001); Bibbero Sys., Inc.
v. Colwell Sys., Inc., 893 F.2d 1104, 1106 (9th Cir. 1990). Section 410(c) specifies that
this evidentiary weight is to be afforded where registration is made before or within
five years after the work’s first publication and that the weight afforded to a
registration made thereafter is within the court’s discretion. 17 U.S.C. § 410(c).
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the plaintiff’s work should not be presumed original.123 It is not
entirely clear what should be required to rebut the
presumption on the alternate ground of lack of minimal
creativity because, as is argued throughout this article, the
legal concepts of creativity and originality are highly elusive.
Further, courts are not always precise in specifying whether
the burden has been rebutted before launching into discussions
of originality. Accordingly, this article addresses the proxies for
originality that courts, viewing the evidence in the record, have
adopted without necessarily identifying whether the burden
has shifted at the time of decision.
The next three sections introduce and discuss three
proxies for identifying originality in photography litigation.
B.

Proxy of Ontology

Employing perhaps the most controversial proxy, the
proxy of ontology, courts use the fact that a photograph
exhibits the essential features of a photograph to ground a
finding of originality. Under this line of reasoning, originality
becomes a constituent aspect of a photograph. In Decker, Inc. v.
G & N Equipment Co.,124 for example, the plaintiff alleged that
the defendants had copied photographs of equipment
components from its catalog, including closely framed images of
rubber replacement “shoes” for doorstops. In opposing
summary judgment, the plaintiff mounted an argument based
almost entirely on provenance. Other than to stress that it was
the source of the photographs, the only modicum of creativity
the plaintiff could identify was that the “products are presented
in a . . . certain way using lighting and unique positions to
enhance their appeal and thereby the sales of the products.”125
The court denied the defendants’ summary judgment motion as
123

See, e.g., N. Coast Indus. v. Jason Maxwell, Inc., 972 F.2d 1031, 1033-34
(9th Cir. 1992); Masquerade Novelty, Inc. v. Unique Indus., Inc., 912 F.2d 663, 668-69
(3d Cir. 1990); Durham Indus., Inc. v. Tomy Corp., 630 F.2d 905, 908-09 (2d Cir. 1980);
see also 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 31, § 12.11[B][1][b].
124
438 F. Supp. 2d 734 (E.D. Mich. 2006).
125
Plaintiff’s Brief In Opposition, at 4, Decker, Inc. v. G & N Equip. Co., 438
F. Supp. 2d 734, 742 (E.D. Mich. 2006) (No. 05-cv-70128). Similarly, plaintiff’s
president submitted an affidavit stating that the plaintiff “photographed products in a
certain way using lighting and unique positions to enhance their appeal” and that its
original “photographs are prominently featured in its catalogs and are not copies of
competitors’ photographs and are in no way copies of other pre-existing works. Rather,
the photographs solely originate with” the plaintiff. Aff. of John Chase, at 2, Decker,
Inc. v. G & N Equip. Co., 438 F. Supp. 2d 734, 742 (E.D. Mich. 2006) (No. 05-cv-70128).
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to the photographs, determining that “to the extent that
lighting and posing were involved in the photographs, the
Plaintiff has shown sufficient evidence to support a claim of
originality in the photographs.”126
While the posture of Decker, ruling on a summary
judgment motion by defendants, no doubt contributed to the
court’s terse discussion, its seemingly perfunctory recitation of
photographic elements perpetuates a legal discourse in which a
work’s existence as a photograph—its constitution as a twodimensional work in which lighting and perspective are
perceptible—signals that the work is sufficiently original. This
signaling function is reflected in pronouncements by both the
Copyright Office and the circuit courts (although, as discussed
below,127 a few district courts have, on rare occasion, denied
protection to photographs on originality grounds). According to
a Copyright Office representative, photographs receive far less
scrutiny in the registration process than, for example, works of
art that are seen as potentially appropriating simple geometric
shapes.128 Typically, the images for which the Office denies
registration are X-rays or other medical images whose purpose
is articulated to be diagnostic rather than creative or
instructional.129 Indeed, although it later rejected this stance,
the Copyright Office at one time suggested that, given the
126

Decker, 438 F. Supp. 2d at 742; see also Reece v. Island Treasures Art
Gallery, Inc., 468 F. Supp. 2d 1197, 1202 (D. Haw. 2006) (citing applicable principles
without explaining what made photograph of hula performance original other than its
existence as a photograph); Epic Metals Corp. v. Condec, Inc., 867 F. Supp. 1009, 101314 (M.D. Fla. 1994) (same with respect to photographs of construction sites).
127
See infra Part II.C.
128
Telephone Interview with William R. Briganti, Assistant Chief, Visual Arts
& Recordation Div., U.S. Copyright Office, in Wash., D.C. (July 20, 2010) [hereinafter
Briganti Interview]. The decisions of the internal appeals body, the Copyright Office
Review Board, bear this out: no rejections of photographs appear to have been appealed,
suggesting that none was rejected by the examiner in the first instance. See Decisions of
the Appeals Board—U.S. Copyright Office, 1995-2009, IP MALL, http://www.ipmall.
info/hosted_resources/CopyrightAppeals/fplchome.asp (last visited May 12, 2011).
129
Briganti Interview, supra note 128. This stance accords with an
intentionalist view of art. See sources cited supra note 56. In other contexts, such as Ansel
Adams’ prints of X-rays recently auctioned by Sotheby’s, one would expect that such
images would be registered by the Office. See Catalog from Polaroid Exhibit Displaying
Ansel Adams Print of X-ray of Hand (Lot 460), SOTHEBY’S, http://www.sothebys.com/
app/ecatalogue/fhtml/index.jsp?event_id=30084#/r=index-fhtml.jsp?event_id=30084|r.
main=lot.jsp?event_id=30084&id=460 (last visited Apr. 14, 2011). Professor Jessica
Silbey’s recent article brings to mind another example. See Jessica Silbey, Evidence Verité
and the Law of Film, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 1257, 1277 (2010) (discussing Lennart Nilsson’s
iconic “Life Before Birth” photograph of a fetus in utero, published in Life magazine on
April 30, 1965). Such images would likely be deemed to reflect the requisite
intentionalist and institutionalist bona fides to qualify as art that is protectable.
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choices usually reflected in photographs, “there is no issue with
respect to whether or not a photograph is copyrightable” and
that “it is possible to consider registration without an actual
deposit of the work.”130
The circuit courts echo this position. As expressed in
Schrock v. Learning Curve International, Inc., a case that will
be discussed in greater depth below, the Seventh Circuit’s view
appears to be that photographs will contain sufficient
originality in the rendering choices they display unless they
copy other works, either “slavishly” or by mimicking the choices
expressed in earlier photographs with “total or near-total
fidelity.”131 This apparently is also the view of the Eleventh
Circuit132 and, as outlined above in Ets-Hokin, the Ninth
Circuit. This position, which makes originality in photography
turn entirely on the first prong of Feist—independent creation
(or noncopying)—implies that the minimal creativity standard
will always be met in a photograph. Even if, as this article argues,
definitive accounts of originality and its creativity component are
elusive, encouragement for the position that one medium is free
from these requirements is difficult to square with Feist.
Nor is it clear that the first prong of Feist, noncopying,
will play much of a role as gatekeeper. The Seventh Circuit in
Schrock felt compelled to rule out the possibility that the
plaintiff’s photographs might be “slavish copies” of the toy
trains depicted in the images.133 The court derived this
130

Registration of Claims to Copyright, Group Registration of Photographs, 60
Fed. Reg. 62,057, 62,058 (Dec. 4, 1995). The Copyright Office proffered this view, which
it later rejected, in the course of its creation of a group registration option for
photographs. In connection with a request for comments on a version of the regulations
that was not ultimately adopted (another version was), the Office stated:
Photographs are generally copyrightable; an individual selects a camera,
lens, film, and an image to capture taking into consideration choices such as
lighting and composition. Since photographs are usually entirely new works,
for examination purposes there is no issue with respect to whether or not a
photograph is copyrightable. Therefore, it is possible to consider registration
without an actual deposit of the work.
Id.
131

Schrock v. Learning Curve Int’l, Inc., 586 F.3d 513, 519 (7th Cir. 2009) (quoting
Mannion v. Coors Brewing Co., 377 F. Supp. 2d 444, 452 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) and citing
Bridgeman Art Library, Ltd. v. Corel Corp., 25 F. Supp. 2d 421, 427 (S.D.N.Y. 1998)).
132
Latimer v. Roaring Toyz, Inc., 601 F.3d 1224, 1234 (11th Cir. 2010)
(“Except for a limited class of photographs that can be characterized as ‘slavish copies,’
courts have recognized that most photographs contain at least some originality in their
rendition of the subject-matter.” (citing Schrock, 586 F.3d at 519 and Rogers v. Koons,
960 F.2d 301, 307 (2d Cir. 1992))).
133
Schrock, 586 F.3d at 519. The need for the discussion is perplexing given
that the court had assumed for the purposes of the appeal that the photographs
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exception from Bridgeman Art Library, Ltd. v. Corel Corp.134 In
that case, the originality of photographic transparency and
digital image replicas of old masters’ public domain paintings
was challenged. It seems reasonable, with facts that involve the
duplication of one two-dimensional work into another, as in
Bridgeman, to consider the possibility that the photographic
transparencies were in fact slavish copies.135 But in Schrock, the
issue was the traditional role of photography: capturing a threedimensional object in a two-dimensional format. The import of
the Seventh Circuit’s analysis is that, unless a photograph of a
three-dimensional subject matter has too closely mimicked
aspects of another photograph, then it will be original.136
The proxy of ontology raises issues beyond doctrinal
compliance with Feist with respect to photographs. A recent
Tenth Circuit case revealed how the powerful attachment to
photography as a reliably original medium can be used to find
the originality in “nonphotographs” lacking. In Meshwerks, Inc.
v. Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc.,137 the question of originality
arose in the context of computer-generated imagery (CGI)
depicting digital wire-frame models of Toyota vehicles. These
digital renderings substituted for product photographs of the
cars and permitted the advertiser to alter the car’s color,
features, and surroundings with the click of a mouse.138
Drawing upon lessons from photography,139 the court held that
qualified as derivative works with respect to the copyrighted toy trains and, hence, by
definition, were “recast, transformed, or adapted” from the underlying trains in some
way. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
134
25 F. Supp. 2d 421 (S.D.N.Y. 1998), aff’d on reh’g, 36 F. Supp. 2d 191
(S.D.N.Y. 1999).
135
See Butler, supra note 10, at 106 (“When the purpose of the photograph is
to copy a two-dimensional image, the originality of that photograph deserves closer
scrutiny than the assertion that all photographs contain some personal influence by
the photographer.”).
136
See Mary Campbell Wojcik, The Antithesis of Originality: Bridgeman,
Image Licensors, and the Public Domain, 30 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT L.J. 257, 264-67
(2008) (discussing application of Bridgeman to three-dimensional context); infra Part
III.C (discussing staging and shooting of similar scenes).
137
528 F.3d 1258 (10th Cir. 2008).
138
Id. at 1260.
139
Id. at 1263-64. For a critique of the court’s comparison of the models to
photographs, see Andrew C. Landsman, Comment, Fender Bender: 3D Computer
Modeling of Commercial Objects and the Meshwerks v. Toyota Decision, 8 J. MARSHALL
REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 429 (2009); Michael Palumbo, Note, Copyright Protection for the
Fruits of Digital Labor: Finding Originality in Digital Wire-Frames, 44 NEW ENG. L.
REV. 127, 150 (2009); see also Bryce Clayton Newell, Independent Creation and
Originality in the Age of Imitated Reality: A Comparative Analysis of Copyright and
Database Protection for Digital Models of Real People, BYU INT’L L. & MGMT. REV.,
Spring 2010, at 93.
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the computer screen images “accurately,” in intent and
achievement, depicted the real-world cars, and it therefore
denied copyright protection.140 The images appended to the
opinion, however, belie the court’s claim that the models
“depict nothing more than unadorned Toyota vehicles—the car
as car.”141 They depict a graphic representation of a car in three
stages—one of pure gridlines, one of gridlines over a solid car
body, and one purely solid, appearing almost like clay.142
Although a viewer would think the models represent a car,143
these images appear far less like an actual car than the shiny
finished product images that are also appended by the court.144
Nevertheless, the plaintiff’s images stray from the
photographic ideal imagined by the court: the images are
“untouched by a digital paintbrush; they are not depicted in
front of a palm tree, whizzing down the open road, or climbing
up a mountainside” and are not original.145
While the implications of the growth of CGI in many
different realms are beyond the scope of this article, it is
sufficient to say that CGI is extending to many areas formerly
occupied by photography.146 Thus, a principled basis should be
found for the application of copyright to these areas—more
than the not-being-a-photograph analysis applied here.
C.

Proxy of Narrative

Use of authorial narrative is a species of analysis,
advocated by some147 and questioned by others,148 that assesses a
140

Meshwerks, 528 F.3d at 1268-69.
Id. at 1265.
142
Id. at 1271.
143
See Jeffrey Malkan, What Is a Copy?, 23 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 419, 42732 (2005) (discussing differences between representation, resemblance, and reproduction
and arguing that representation “has a figural or metaphorical structure”).
144
See Meshwerks, 528 F.3d at 1272; see also Tushnet, supra note 32, at 33-34
(discussing aspects of the depictions of cardinals, abstracted from any background, in
Franklin Mint Corp. v. National Wildlife Art Exchange, Inc., 575 F.2d 62 (3d Cir. 1978),
which undermine the notion that the images are representations of reality even if,
because of representational convention, we perceive them as such). The fact that the
images were later to be filled out and manipulated by the Toyota advertising team,
Meshwerks, 528 F.3d at 1266, should not be dispositive of the question of whether the
plaintiff had made its own creative contribution to the project.
145
Meshwerks, 528 F.3d at 1265.
146
See, e.g., Conor Risch, Why CGI?, PHOTO DISTRICT NEWS, Nov. 2010, at 30.
147
See, e.g., David Nimmer, Copyright in the Dead Sea Scrolls: Authorship
and Originality, 38 HOUS. L. REV. 1, 159 (2001).
148
See, e.g., Jane C. Ginsburg, The Concept of Authorship in Comparative
Copyright Law, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 1063, 1085-88 (2003) (critiquing intent as principle
141
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work by resorting to authorial intent. Author narratives,
proffered on some occasions by individual author-plaintiffs and
on other occasions by corporate copyright holders, constitute
the second proxy courts rely on in challenges to photographic
originality.149 It is not surprising that this is so. With overt
aesthetic assessment ostensibly ruled out by Bleistein, a return
to word-based evidence of originality in the form of testimony
from the photographer was a likely substitute.150 Indeed, as
mentioned above, this method was employed in Burrow-Giles.
Cases in the last twenty years, following Feist, have had to
walk a fine line, since authorial process could form a part of the
originality picture, but it could not be phrased so as to indicate
that sweat-of-the-brow labor outweighed creative input.151
In Schrock, for example, the Seventh Circuit
adjudicated a copyright infringement suit by a photographer
against his former client. Daniel Schrock, who was hired to
photograph the “Thomas & Friends” toys for promotional
materials, alleged that the client had used the photographs
beyond the specified term.152 The defendants countered, in part,
with the argument that the photographs lacked originality.153

of authorship); Russ VerSteeg, Intent, Originality, Creativity and Joint Authorship, 68
BROOK. L. REV. 123, 132-33 (2002) (arguing that intent to author, while a factor, should
not be dispositive for originality determination).
149
Professor Clarisa Long has pointed out that given the inexpressible and
idiosyncratic nature of copyright goods, the cost of rules requiring exhaustive
description of these goods would outweigh the benefits. Long, supra note 30, at 469; see
generally Fromer, supra note 76. While this is true with respect to upfront copyright
claiming, detailed description is clearly part of the litigation dance. Long, supra note
30, at 500, 510. It is not just with respect to originality determinations that authorial
narrative may play a crucial role. In the fair use case Blanch v. Koons, the Second
Circuit placed heavy emphasis on defendant Jeff Koons’ explanation of his purpose in
using the plaintiff’s photograph in its conclusion that Koons’ work was transformative.
See 467 F.3d 244, 252-53 (2d Cir. 2006).
150
See Tushnet, supra note 32, at 3-6 (discussing the law’s comfort with text
in contrast to images).
151
See Mannion v. Coors Brewing Co., 377 F. Supp. 2d 444, 451 (S.D.N.Y.
2005) (framing this tension).
152
Schrock v. Learning Curve Int’l, Inc., 586 F.3d 513 (7th Cir. 2009). The
defendants were the “Thomas & Friends” copyright owner and its licensee who had
hired Schrock. As is common, the suit arose against the backdrop of a number of
contractual relationships and the alleged use of the photographs by the defendants
beyond the term provided by the photographer. Id. at 516. Indeed, the contractual
relations were so unclear that the court remanded for a determination of whether the
defendants had secured an implied license to continue using the photographs and
whether the parties had agreed to alter the default rules relating to Schrock’s right to
seek copyright for his photographs as derivative works. Id. at 516, 524-25.
153
Id. at 517.
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Citing Feist’s low threshold requirement for creativity,154 the
court accepted the idea that original expression contributed by
a photographer often pertains not to the staging of the depicted
scene but to the way in which an image is rendered.155 But its
attempt to describe affirmatively what made the photographs
original was palpably weak. It acknowledged that the
photographs were “accurate depictions” of the trains, but it held
that the photographer’s “artistic and technical choices combine
to create a two-dimensional image that is subtly but nonetheless
sufficiently his own.”156 As in Burrow-Giles, the court “confirmed”
this conclusion by invoking the photographer’s description of his
“creative process in depicting the toys”:
Schrock explained how he used various camera and lighting
techniques to make the toys look more “life like,” “personable,” and
“friendly.” He explained how he tried to give the toys “a little bit of
dimension” and that it was his goal to make the toys “a little bit better
than what they look like when you actually see them on the shelf.”157

While styled as a confirmation, however, this testimony of the
photographer in fact serves as the sole content for the court’s
conclusion that the photographs were “subtly but nonetheless
sufficiently” original. The adoption of language, even
wholesale, from parties’ court papers is, of course, not unusual
in litigation. But the mode of reasoning creates a copyright
system in which an authorship narrative, as a proxy for
originality, threatens to trump the attributes of the work itself:
nearly any straightforward commercial image of a toy train will
be capable of being described, a priori, as “friendly.”158
This mode of analysis was also visible in a rare instance
of originality addressed at trial. In Schiffer Publishing, Ltd. v.
Chronicle Books, LLC, the district court’s findings of fact on the
issue of originality consisted of the trial and deposition
testimony of the five photographers who had taken the
154

Id. at 519. As discussed infra, the court assumed, without deciding, that
the photographs were derivative works and reviewed them on that basis as well. Id.
155
Id. (describing originality in the rendition as “the effect created by the
combination of [the photographer’s] choices of perspective, angle, lighting, shading,
focus, lens, and so on” (citing Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 307 (2d Cir. 1992);
Mannion, 377 F. Supp. 2d at 452)).
156
Id. Thus they deserved the limited protection afforded to derivative works.
Id. at 519-20.
157
Id. at 519.
158
But see SHL Imaging, Inc. v. Artisan House, Inc., 117 F. Supp. 2d 301, 310
(S.D.N.Y. 2000) (where the court begins its analysis by recounting the photographer’s
description of his creative process but continues on to a more in-depth discussion of the
photographs’ formal properties).
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photographs—in this case, 118 photographs of fabric swatches
for a book on the topic.159 In particular, the court relied upon the
testimony as to the processes by which the photographers
selected and shot the images, including testimony that a
medium format camera was used “not because it more
accurately depicted the colors and details” but because, for the
photographer, “it was just a preference.”160 Likewise, Kodak film
was chosen over Fuji because it provided “warmer tints.”161
The court’s conclusion that the originality of the images
had been demonstrated was couched in the language of
photographer choice: choice of cameras, choice of film, choice of
lens, choice of lighting, and choice to take multiple images.162 “In
the words of [photographer] Joy Shih, the decision of which
picture to use was made according to ‘which image would project
what [she] was trying to get [the fabric] to look like.’”163 And the
court held that these choices were reflected in the images:
Certain of the photographs evoke the texture of a particular fabric.
Others have exaggerated or understated the tone and values of the
colors in a pattern when compared to the original fabric swatches.
Some photographs are more blurry than the patterns they represent,
while others display an almost clinical sharpness.164

The court’s conclusions appear to synthesize the evidence in a
fair manner, but they do not identify what makes the images
creative other than the fact that they reflect authorial whimsy
and that they were not intended to depict, nor succeeded in
depicting, the underlying fabric swatches too accurately.165
Indeed, the decisive factor in the court’s analysis was the
evidence that, unlike in Bridgeman, the plaintiffs’
photographers were not striving for accuracy as the goal.166 “In
fact, several photographers clearly stated that they never

159

Schiffer Publ’g, Ltd. v. Chronicle Books, LLC, No. Civ.A. 03-4962, 2004 WL
2583817, at *1-3 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 12, 2004).
160
Id. at *1 (quoting photographer Joy Shih) (internal quotation marks omitted).
161
Id.
162
Cf. Ginsburg, supra note 148, at 1077 (“To say that a work’s creator
exercised choice as to the contents and presentation of the work is another way of
saying that the work is original . . . .”).
163
Schiffer Publ’g, 2004 WL 2583817, at *7 (quoting photographer Joy Shih).
164
Id.
165
See generally VerSteeg, supra note 17 (favoring comparative variation test
over creativity test).
166
Schiffer Publ’g, 2004 WL 2583817, at *7-8.
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compared the fabric swatches to their photographs, precisely
because such a comparison was unimportant to their goals.”167
As mentioned above, the Bridgeman case showed that
even images of venerated works of art might fall victim when
accompanied by the wrong sort of narrative. That case presents
difficult questions because the rendering elements typically
protectable in photographs, such as choice of subject, lighting,
and composition, were surely present. And yet the court,
seizing upon an emperor-has-no-clothes insight, determined
that the finished products were copies of the paintings “as
exact as science and technology [would] permit.”168 Relying in no
small part on the Nimmer treatise’s categorical exceptions to
the protectability of photographs—slavish copying and exact
reenactment169—the court held that the transparencies were
“slavish copies” and hence insufficiently creative.170 While
Professor VerSteeg has argued that the court did not rely upon
authorial intent in denying protection to the Bridgeman
images,171 the court’s repeated invocation of the plaintiff’s
express goals belies this claim. In fact, by repeatedly pointing
to the plaintiff’s admissions of intent to achieve exactitude in
its reproductions,172 the court was able to sidestep fraught
questions about why the nature of the subject matter—public
domain paintings—should thwart the traditionally protected
rendering choices. In this way, Bridgeman is the pinnacle of
judicial decision making premised upon authorial narrative—
or the express disclaimer of one.
Absence of authorial narrative has also grounded two
other decisions in which courts have found originality lacking,
albeit at an early stage of litigation. In Custom Dynamics, LLC
v. Radiantz LED Lighting, Inc. and Oriental Art Printing, Inc.
v. Goldstar Printing Corp., the district courts denied motions

167

Id. at *8.
Bridgeman Art Library, Ltd. v. Corel Corp., 25 F. Supp. 2d 421, 427
(S.D.N.Y. 1998), aff’d on reh’g, 36 F. Supp. 2d 191 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
169
1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 31, § 2.08[E][2]. But see Ann Bartow, The
Hegemony of the Copyright Treatise, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 581 (2004) (critiquing heavy
dependence by courts on the Nimmer treatise on copyright).
170
Bridgeman, 36 F. Supp. 2d at 196-97 (“[T]here was no spark of originality”
when the goal was to “reproduce the underlying works with absolute fidelity.”).
171
VerSteeg, supra note 148, at 137-39.
172
See Bridgeman, 36 F. Supp. 2d at 197 (noting that “plaintiff by its own
admission has labored to create ‘slavish copies’ of public domain works”); see also
Bridgeman, 25 F. Supp. 2d at 427 (noting that “Bridgeman admittedly seeks to
duplicate exactly the images of the underlying works”).
168
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for preliminary injunctions concerning images of motorcycle
lighting accessories and Chinese food dishes, respectively.173

A photograph lacking originality,
Custom Dynamics, LLC v. Radiantz LED Lighting, Inc.174

A photograph lacking originality,
Oriental Art Printing, Inc. v. Goldstar Printing Corp.175

173

Custom Dynamics, LLC v. Radiantz LED Lighting, Inc., 535 F. Supp. 2d
542, 549 (E.D.N.C. 2008); Oriental Art Printing, Inc. v. Goldstar Printing Corp., 175 F.
Supp. 2d 542, 544 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (subsequent history omitted). In Oriental Art
Printing, the court also granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss the plaintiffs’
copyright claim as to the photographs on the ground that they were not original,
copyrightable works. 175 F. Supp. 2d at 550.
174
Verified Complaint at exhibit 7, Custom Dynamics, LLC v. Radiantz LED
Lighting, Inc., 535 F. Supp. 2d 542 (E.D.N.C. 2008) (No. 07 Civ. 493).
175
Complaint at exhibit A, Oriental Art Printing, Inc. v. Goldstar Printing
Corp., 175 F. Supp. 2d 542 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (No. 00 Civ. 8374).
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Both courts reasoned, in part, that the photographs
“were meant to serve the purely utilitarian purpose of
displaying examples of [the] product to potential consumers”
and, citing Feist, held that there was “no ‘creative spark’ involved
in a purely descriptive picture of a product.”176 In Oriental Art
Printing, upon which Custom Dynamics relied heavily, the court
specifically noted the absence of a plausible authorship narrative
in that “no description of either the lighting or angles employed,
or any desired expression” was provided.177 Reading these
decisions, one has the sense that the courts felt they had
encountered an opportunity to apply Feist in a principled way by
rejecting a garden-variety photograph. But these images, while
low-grade, apparently reflected at least some lighting and
compositional decision making.178 What was missing was an
authorship narrative the courts deemed sufficient.179
D.

Proxy of Comparison

Perhaps the closest courts come to grounding originality
in an image itself is through the proxy of comparison.
Comparison may take one of two forms: (i) comparison of the
litigated photograph to other photographs, and (ii) comparison
of the photograph to the underlying subjects depicted therein.
1. Comparisons to Other Photographs
Courts have compared a litigated photograph to other
photographs submitted by the parties to illustrate the possible
range of creative expression available under the circumstances.
In one case, for instance, a court found that “master
176

Custom Dynamics, 535 F. Supp. 2d at 549 (citing Oriental Art Printing, 175
F. Supp. 2d at 546-47). The court in Oriental Art Printing also stated that each of the
potentially protectable elements in the photographs would be barred from
protectability under the scènes à faire doctrine since they “flow necessarily” from the
“realistic depiction of most common Chinese food dishes.” 175 F. Supp. 2d at 547 n.3.
See infra part III.C (discussing scènes à faire doctrine).
177
Oriental Art Printing, 175 F. Supp. 2d at 547. The absence of any authorial
narrative was exacerbated by the failure to attach attractive copies of the relevant
photographs. See id. (noting that “as presented by plaintiffs . . . each photograph is a
rather obscure, black-and-white, depiction of a particular Chinese dish”).
178
See id. (“From the exhibits submitted, both the lighting and angle appear
to be equivalent in every photograph.”).
179
Note that Professor Michael Madison’s argument, that we should
reformulate copyright as a knowledge law, involves, at some level, a narrative basis.
Madison, supra note 10, at 849 (suggesting that artists, lawyers, and courts would have
to reformulate what they do in knowledge-oriented terms).
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photographs” supplied by the defendant in an attempt to show
that the plaintiff’s photographs of mirrored picture frames had
been shot in a “straightforward manner”180 actually undermined
that very claim. The court determined that the master
photographs had “none of the aesthetic elements that ma[d]e
plaintiff’s photographs attractive. The gilded frames [were] dull
and the details [were] obscured by shadows or over exposed.”181
Similar reasoning was applied by another court in response to
the parties’ submissions of multiple images depicting sniper
teams in different positions; the court concluded that a “wide
range of possibilities [was] available” and found plaintiff’s
compositional choices sufficiently original.182
Even where it is not clear that a court is referring to
alternate images in the record, courts appear to engage in
reasoning that relies upon the proxy of comparison. In
Mannion, for example, Judge Kaplan examined the photograph
at issue, which depicted a close-up, upwardly-focused shot of
basketball star Kevin Garnett wearing white clothing and
much jewelry against a clouded sky, and he held it to be
original. Originality in the rendition, which the court anchored
in the fact that the photograph had not been copied, was
bolstered by the photographer’s “relatively unusual angle and
distinctive lighting.”183 Additionally, the photographer’s
“composition—posing man against sky—evidences originality
in the creation of the subject.”184 In the absence of any reference
to other photographs in the record, the only way in which these
statements may be understood are as statements of comparison
between the Garnett photograph and others that Judge Kaplan
had seen during the course of his lifetime (if not in the course
of the litigation).
2. Comparisons to the Underlying Subject Through the
Derivative Work Framework
Product photographs are sometimes categorized as
derivative works, that is, works based upon one or more
preexisting works.185 For courts subscribing to this view, the
180

SHL Imaging, Inc. v. Artisan House, Inc., 117 F. Supp. 2d 301, 311
(S.D.N.Y. 2000).
181
Id.
182
Bryant v. Gordon, 483 F. Supp. 2d 605, 615-16 (N.D. Ill. 2007).
183
Mannion v. Coors Brewing Co., 377 F. Supp. 2d 444, 455 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
184
Id.
185
A “derivative work”
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notion is that photographs recast and adapt their subject
matter and that their originality should be assessed through
the framework applied to derivative works. As usually
formulated, the test for originality in a derivative work is
whether the author has “contributed something more than a
merely trivial variation, something recognizably his own” or a
“distinguishable variation” from the underlying work.186
The typical fact pattern driving the cases’ inquiry into
derivative work status is a business relationship gone awry
between a photographer and a client—usually a product
manufacturer whose products the photographer was hired to
shoot. The defendants in these cases have defended their use of
the photographs beyond the agreed-upon terms by arguing that
the photographs are derivative works that do not stand as
protectable works on their own. This argument is premised on
the notion that derivative works are subject to a higher burden
of originality187 or that any originality expressed in the
photographs relates to the defendants’ products.188
Application of derivative work status to photographs is
not without debate,189 but there are several reasons to think
that the controversy is a red herring, at least with respect to
the ultimate conclusion of whether originality has been

is a work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a translation,
musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture version,
sound recording, art reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other
form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted. A work
consisting of editorial revisions, annotations, elaborations, or other
modifications which, as a whole, represent an original work of authorship, is
a “derivative work.”
17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
186
See L. Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486, 490 (2d Cir. 1976) (en
banc) (quoting Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 103 (2d Cir.
1951) (internal quotation marks omitted); Gerlach-Barklow Co. v. Morris & Bendien,
Inc., 23 F.2d 159, 161 (2d Cir. 1927)).
187
See Schrock v. Learning Curve, Int’l, 586 F.3d 513, 520 (7th Cir. 2009);
SHL Imaging, Inc. v. Artisan House, Inc., 117 F. Supp. 2d 301, 305 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
188
See Latimer v. Roaring Toyz, Inc., 574 F. Supp. 2d 1265, 1273 (M.D. Fla.
2008) (subsequent history omitted).
189
Compare Schrock, 586 F.3d at 518 (assuming without deciding that
photographs were derivative works), and Ets-Hokin v. Skyy Spirits, Inc., 225 F.3d
1068, 1077-81 (9th Cir. 2000) (suggesting that photographs could be derivative works if
their subjects are copyrightable “preexisting works”) (subsequent history omitted), and
Latimer, 601 F.3d 1224, 1234-35 (11th Cir. 2010) (suggesting that derivative work
status would be more consistent with copyright law but refraining from deciding the
question), with SHL Imaging, 117 F. Supp. 2d at 305-06 (ruling that photographing a
subject does not create derivative work). Accord 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 31,
§ 3.03[C] (discussing controversy).

1526

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 76:4

First,
a
controversial
version
of
the
shown.190
nontrivial/distinguishable variation test, earlier espoused by
the Seventh Circuit, has now been clarified: Schrock makes
explicit that derivative works need not demonstrate a higher
degree of originality than ordinary works.191 Second, courts
routinely refer to Feist’s originality test as part of their
analysis,192 so any claim that a modicum of creativity does not
suffice—or is not necessary—for derivative work authorship is
misguided. Rather, there is every reason to expect that in the
determination of courts, creativity-based originality and
nontrivial/distinguishable variation will rise or fall together.
The
continued
reliance
by
courts
on
the
nontrivial/distinguishable variation test undoubtedly reflects
its attractiveness as a straightforward, judicially applicable
test for the award of copyright. For this reason, some have
proposed grounding the criteria for originality in variation
rather than creativity.193 Nevertheless, unless and until such a
reformulation officially occurs, there appears to be no reason
why the originality of a photograph should be assessed
differently based upon its subject matter.194 The same added
190

1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 31, § 3.03[C][3]; Robert W. Clarida & Robert
J. Bernstein, Revisiting Derivative Works in Schrock Reversal, N.Y. L.J., Nov. 20, 2009.
191
Contra Gracen v. Bradford Exch., 698 F.2d 300, 305 (7th Cir. 1983)
(requiring “a sufficiently gross difference between the underlying and the derivative
work” and that a “derivative work must be substantially different from the underlying
work to be copyrightable”). Clarifying Seventh Circuit precedent, Schrock stated: “(1)
the originality requirement for derivative works is not more demanding than the
originality requirement for other works; and (2) the key inquiry is whether there is
sufficient nontrivial expressive variation in the derivative work to make it
distinguishable from the underlying work in some meaningful way.” 586 F.3d at 521. The
precise language of the Seventh Circuit’s formulation is drawn from the Nimmer treatise.
See Schrock, 586 F.3d at 520-21; 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 31, § 3.03[A].
192
See, e.g., Schrock, 586 F.3d at 519; ATC Distrib. Grp. v. Whatever It Takes
Transmissions & Parts, Inc., 402 F.3d 700, 712 (6th Cir. 2005); Dam Things from Den.
v. Russ Berrie & Co., 290 F.3d 548, 563-64 (3d Cir. 2002); Matthew Bender & Co. v.
West Publ’g Co., 158 F.3d 674, 680 (2d Cir. 1998). The Tenth Circuit has signaled an
interest in a unitary, Feist-based standard. See Meshwerks, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales
U.S.A., Inc., 528 F.3d 1258, 1266 n.7 (10th Cir. 2008).
193
See, e.g., VerSteeg, supra note 17, at 840-43; VerSteeg, supra note 88, at 588.
194
Cf. Gorman, supra note 17, at 7 (“[I]t is strange—given the nature of the
photographic medium—to insist as a condition of copyrightability that derivative
photographs be substantial or gross departures from an underlying work. The same
‘minimal creativity’ standard should apply whether a photographer captures a scene
from nature, a public domain art work, or an art work protected by copyright.”).
Likewise, William F. Patry argues that there is just one test for originality, the Feist
standard, which should be applied to nonderivative and derivative works alike. The
courts’ continued invocation and proliferation of a multitude of tests for originality in
derivative works is, he argues, incorrect and unnecessarily confusing in a post-Feist
world. 2 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT, §§ 3.53, 3.55 (2010).
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value that a photographer contributes—decisions about lighting,
angle, and composition, for example—are made whether the
photographic subject is a thing in nature or an object for sale,
and it would be patently absurd to ask whether the Obama
Photograph reflects a nontrivial/distinguishable variation from
the man himself as the basis for copyright protection.
The Seventh Circuit’s application of the variation test
reveals its shortcomings in identifying originality or creativity,
at least when it comes to the comparison of two-dimensional
photographs and their three-dimensional subject matters:
If the photographer’s rendition of a copyrighted work varies enough
from the underlying work to enable the photograph to be
distinguished from the underlying work (aside from the obvious shift
from three dimensions to two195), then the photograph contains
sufficient incremental originality to qualify for copyright. Schrock’s
photos of the “Thomas & Friends” toys are highly accurate product
photos but contain minimally sufficient variation in angle,
perspective, lighting, and dimension to be distinguishable from the
underlying [toy trains]; they are not “slavish copies.”196

Is the comparison that yields the conclusion of “minimally
sufficient variation” in this quote being made between the
photographs and the toy trains as seen in appellate court
chambers, under the conditions the judges happened to view them
in reviewing the lower court record? Presumably it would be
possible for the court to view the toys at the right angle, and with
the right lighting, such that there would be no variation between
the photographs and the toys other than the change of medium.
In any event, the bare ability to distinguish between two works
does not appear to say anything about a work’s creativity.
III.

TOWARD A THEORY OF COPYRIGHT AND CREATIVITY

Returning to the question that animates this article:
after Feist, what should originality analysis in a traditionally
protected, yet heavily litigated medium such as photography
consist of? Should courts be looking to weed out unoriginal
photographs as a means of preserving the integrity of the
copyright system?

195

It is worth pausing to reflect that the most obvious variation, the change of
medium from toy to photograph, is discounted in light of prior precedent. See Schrock,
586 F.3d at 519 n.3, 522 (citing Durham Indus., Inc. v. Tomy Corp., 630 F.2d 905, 910 (2d
Cir. 1980); L. Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486, 491 (2d Cir. 1976) (en banc)).
196
Id. at 522 (internal citation omitted).
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This final section of the article attempts to address
these questions by evaluating the proxies described above in
the broader context of originality jurisprudence and
scholarship and of the photography industry. While originality
determinations made pursuant to the proxies of narrative and
comparison are not likely to be demanding, they offer some
benefit above and beyond those made pursuant to the proxy of
ontology. Because originality is such an elusive concept,
however, the threshold requirement for originality should not
be heightened, as some have called for in recent scholarship.
While the issues raised by the proliferation of copyrightable
images are serious, the originality threshold is not the best
stage at which to address these issues. First, heightening the
originality bar might distort artistic production or increase
judicial tastemaking. Second, rigorous policing of the scope of
protection to which a work is entitled can go a long way toward
alleviating the need to raise the originality threshold. Finally,
any proposal to heighten the originality requirement should
take into account the complex ways in which creators and
industries finance the production of original, creative works.
A.

Evaluating the Proxies in the Context of Originality
Jurisprudence

Photography is a peculiar copyright beast. On the one
hand, its creative facets have been touted time and again by
court after court. On the other hand, the reason for this legacy
of judicial support is the parade of challenges to its status that
continues to this day. It is not entirely clear why litigants
continue to view the lack of originality defense as a viable
weapon in their arsenal. Lurking in the background seems to
be the expectation that, as technology increasingly facilitates
high-quality image taking by amateurs, courts will start to
conclude that any authorship evidenced in litigated
photographs is miniscule and fungible.197 Widely known
repositories of amateur-produced images, such as the website
Flickr,198 only serve to confirm this viewpoint. Assuming the
status quo continues, and the originality issue continues to be
197

Judge Owen colorfully illustrated this concept in seeking, albeit in a
different context, “more than mere cocktail pianist variations of the piece that are
standard fare in the music trade by any competent musician.” Woods v. Bourne Co.,
841 F. Supp. 118, 121 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (subsequent history omitted).
198
See FLICKR, http://www.flickr.com (last visited Feb. 20, 2011).
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litigated, does Feist command that courts look to deem some
percentage of these photographs unoriginal?
One clear virtue of the current system, from the
viewpoint of copyright holders, is predictability. Photographers
and firms holding copyrights in photographs can be fairly
assured that, should they press a copyright claim, they can
protect their images from, at the very least, outright copying.199
If predictability were the utmost goal, efficient policy surely
would dictate that every photograph be deemed copyrightable
ex ante, thus sparing litigants and courts the regular need to
retrace the history of copyright protection for photography and
to recite the protectable photographic elements of lighting and
angle when the outcome of these machinations is usually
known from the start.200 After all, as argued above, courts
ultimately rely on proxies for originality rather than provide in
each instance a robust accounting of what makes the particular
constellation of choices embedded in a photograph original. If
no such explanation is forthcoming, even for a heavily litigated
medium, then why not opt for predictability?
At a doctrinal level, the answer to this question is that
blanket protection would be incompatible with Feist. The
opinion can fairly be read to apply outside the confines of its
own facts and to require minimal creativity for any
copyrightable work.201 At a deeper policy level, the opinion
suggests that retaining a shred of doubt as to the protectability
of a work provides a needed check on the granting of copyright.
Whether justified on utilitarian or natural rights grounds,
copyright under Feist presents a system under which artists
can generally protect their works, yet must be prepared to
explain their works when challenged.
Accordingly, the proxy of ontology, whereby originality
is viewed as an element of a photograph, is at odds with the
policy of Feist. While Feist does not require much for copyright
protection to attach at the threshold level, it does seem to
require something beyond the mere fact of creation through the
tools of the trade.202 Furthermore, the appellate courts have
199

Of course, applicable defenses, such as fair use, may permit copying.
See, e.g., Schrock, 586 F.3d 513; FragranceNet.com, Inc. v. FragranceX.com,
Inc., 679 F. Supp. 2d 312 (E.D.N.Y. 2010); Mannion v. Coors Brewing Co., 377 F. Supp. 2d
444, 455-56 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); SHL Imaging, Inc. v. Artisan House, Inc., 117 F. Supp. 2d
301 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
201
See supra Part I.B.
202
See Harrison, supra note 10, at 872 (“Thus, having [merely] produced
something is not a useful test of creativity.”).
200
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indicated in recent years that some visual renderings will fail
to achieve copyright protection on originality grounds.203
Questions about the degree to which copyright should apply
uniformly across media are difficult and important, but largely
beyond the scope of this article.204 Nevertheless, some rationale
should explain the difference in approach.
For example, the Tenth Circuit in Meshwerks found that
grayscale digital wire-frame models owed their origin to the
defendants’ cars and failed to make the grade.205 In Darden v.
Peters, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the Copyright Office’s
refusal to register a map and website, holding that coloring a
preexisting census map blue and shading it for threedimensional effect were insufficiently creative contributions.206
In ATC Distribution Group v. Whatever It Takes Transmissions
& Parts, Inc., the Sixth Circuit found hand-drawn illustrations
based on photographs of automobile parts not original.207 And
the Second Circuit, in Sparaco v. Lawler, Matusky, Skelly,
Engineers LLP, affirmed the grant of summary judgment to
defendants where an allegation of infringement involved a site
plan that “sets forth the existing physical characteristics of the
site,” employing no original features, but only “standard
cartographic features.”208 Even among more “artistic” works, it
can be difficult to square the deep-seated deference to
photographs with assessments in other genres. In Satava v.
Lowry, for example, the Ninth Circuit all but denied copyright
protection to a glass-in-glass jellyfish sculpture.209 While the
courts may be correct in concluding that some of these works
203

See, e.g., Meshwerks, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc., 528 F.3d
1258, 1266 (10th Cir. 2008) (digital wire-frame models of cars); Darden v. Peters, 488
F.3d 277, 285 (4th Cir. 2007) (maps and website displaying real estate appraiser
locations); ATC Distrib. Grp. v. Whatever It Takes Transmissions & Parts, Inc., 402
F.3d 700, 712-13 (6th Cir. 2005) (illustrations of parts closely based on photographs);
Sparaco v. Lawler, Matusky, Skelly, Eng’rs LLP, 303 F.3d 460, 467 (2d Cir. 2002) (site
plan incorporating standard cartographic features).
204
See generally Michael W. Carroll, One Size Does Not Fit All: A Framework
for Tailoring Intellectual Property Rights, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 1361 (2009); Michael W.
Carroll, One for All: The Problem of Uniformity Cost in Intellectual Property Law, 55
AM. U. L. REV. 845 (2006).
205
528 F.3d at 1266.
206
488 F.3d at 287; see also 37 C.F.R. § 202.1(a) (2010) (proscribing the award
of copyright for “mere variations of . . . coloring”).
207
402 F.3d at 712-13.
208
303 F.3d at 467.
209
323 F.3d 805, 807 (9th Cir. 2003); see generally Morgan M. Stoddard,
Comment, Mother Nature as Muse: Copyright Protection for Works of Art and
Photographs Inspired by, Based on, or Depicting Nature, 86 N.C. L. REV. 572 (2008)
(critiquing lack of protection by courts for works based on natural phenomena).
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are too tied to their underlying subject matters or too
minimally creative for copyright, the notion that the election of
perspective alone in the case of a photograph210 manifests more
originality than some of the authorial-seeming decisions made
in these cases is hard to justify.
By contrast, the other two proxies identified above, that
of narrative and that of comparison, at least supply
“something” in support of a claim for copyright protection.
Specifically, if a copyright plaintiff wishes to press a claim, the
proxy of narrative permits the something to subsist in an
explanation of the work from which society, as a tradeoff for
copyright, may benefit. For example, the narrative offered in
the Burrow-Giles case itself contributed an elegant account of
authorial practice in the relatively new medium of
photography. The photographer’s explanation in Schrock was
perhaps less flowery, but the narrative it offered—that the
photographer was trying to make the toy trains look
“friendly”—is at least a plausible account of the work that can
be held up in court as a way of backstopping an originality
finding. This is not to say that courts should, adhering to Tom
Wolfe’s classic exposition on modern art, The Painted Word,
cease to look at the image in favor of the narrative.211 Nor is it a
call to begin dissecting the internal processes of the creative
mind.212 The claim is only that, as between an assertion that “if X
is a photograph, then it is original,” and some compelling, or at
least plausible explanation of what a photographer was trying to
accomplish, the latter is more capable of being subject to
scrutiny in litigation, may be more informative to the public, and
therefore is a more justifiable basis for copyright protection.
How, then, should we characterize the Obama
Photograph in the Fairey case? The Associated Press argued
that Garcia, the photographer, brought his artistic input to
bear through his “deliberate selection of a specific moment in
time to capture President Obama’s expression,” his choice to
use a particular lens and lighting, and his composition of the
photograph.213 The AP provided further color by way of an

210

Ets-Hokin v. Skyy Spirits, Inc., 225 F.3d 1068, 1077 (9th Cir. 2000)
(subsequent history omitted).
211
TOM WOLFE, THE PAINTED WORD 6 (1975) (describing the way in which
theory, in modern art, dwarfed the images themselves—“In short: frankly, these days,
without a theory to go with it, I can’t see a painting.”).
212
See Madison, supra note 10, at 851; VerSteeg, supra note 17, at 840-43.
213
AP Amended Answer, supra note 4, at 13-14.
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interview Garcia gave to National Public Radio about his steps
in taking the photograph:
I’m on my knees, I’m down low, and I’m just trying to make a nice,
clean head shot. And I’m waiting. I’m looking at the eyes. I mean,
sure, there’s focus, and I want the background to be a little bit soft. I
wanted a shallow depth of field. I’m looking and waiting. I’m waiting
for him to turn his head a little bit. I’m just patiently making a few
pictures here and there, and I’m just looking for a moment when I
think is right, and I’m taking some images as I’m going along, and
then it happened. Boom, I was there. I was ready.214

While one can imagine from this description that Garcia’s brow
did in fact shed some sweat during the creation of the
photograph, it adequately conveys processes, in support of the
photograph’s originality, that are at least as creative as the
selection of a canvas and paints that would factor into a
protectable painting. Even if “waiting” for Obama to turn his
head should not be characterized as the creation of a scene
under Judge Kaplan’s taxonomy, timing and rendering creativity
appear to be present. Further, the fact that Garcia took more
than one photograph at the event should not affect the analysis;
Monet’s haystacks are not judged unoriginal because they
entailed repeated renderings. While Professor Farley is correct
that courts do not emphasize explicitly the “plodding” nature of
the artistry behind some photography215—here, Garcia’s
“waiting”—acknowledgement of that aspect of photography is
perhaps implicit in all the first-order challenges to originality
that are never brought (as in the Fairey case itself).
The proxy of comparison also remains a valid
mechanism by which courts may assess photographs following
Feist. The Supreme Court’s assessment of the garden-variety
nature of the alphabetization of the white pages was implicitly
made in a comparative context; one can expect that each
Justice had encountered a number of these types of
compilations, and compilations organized according to other
principles, in the course of his or her lifetime.216 Permitting
parties to a copyright litigation to challenge or defend
originality with a bevy of related images squares with the
competence of courts to make comparative judgments, which

214
215
216

Id. at 28 (quoting National Public Radio Interview with Garcia (Feb. 26, 2009)).
Farley, supra note 20, at 449.
See Miller, supra note 10, at 487 n.180 (making this point).
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they do regularly in the context of infringement analyses.217
Furthermore, given the ways in which professional
photographers work—taking multiple (and sometimes
hundreds or thousands) of photographs of a scene—the proxy of
comparison may come closest to allowing a court to distill the
creative input of the photographer. When courts attach a copy
of the challenged image to their decisions along with others
that they relied upon by way of comparison, that contrast
affords later litigants the benefit of a graphic definition of
originality (in the way that the Oscar Wilde, No. 18 photograph
serves as a visual exemplar of originality).
Thus, continued adoption of this proxy is appropriate,
but with one caveat. As discussed above, in the case of
comparisons made in the derivative work context, courts ask
whether there is any nontrivial or distinguishable variation
between a photograph and the subject matter depicted. In so
doing, they are engaging in an exercise with a foregone
conclusion, at least with respect to the ordinary transcription of
three-dimensional objects into two-dimensional photographs.
Variation and hence originality will be found. Thus, this
particular comparative proxy is at odds with Feist.
In the end, obligating a copyright plaintiff to defend a
challenge to originality, either by narrative or by visual
comparison or by some other means, will likely prove an easy
burden to bear. This is not a new test to meet; rather, as has
been described, parties and courts are already engaging in
these approaches to litigation. This article encourages
transparency in the way in which originality is assessed so as
to contribute to ongoing conversations about the social
tradeoffs for the exclusive rights afforded by copyright.
B.

Scholarly Calls to Raise the Originality Threshold

While this article calls for a more transparent—if not
content-rich—application
of
originality
principles
to
photography and other works that may be located on the more
“artistic” end of the continuum, others recently have gone
further and called for a heightening of the creativity
217

They do this in the course of asking whether two works are substantially
similar. See, e.g., Peter F. Gaito Architecture, LLC v. Simone Dev. Corp., 602 F.3d 57,
63 (2d Cir. 2010) (setting out the elements of a copyright infringement claim); see also
Miller, supra note 10, at 487 (advocating thick factual record to be presented to a court
with a range of examples, but suggesting review more akin to nonobviousness
assessment in patent law).
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requirement. This group, rather than eschewing a
determination of the merits of a litigated work, sees promise in
the possibility that courts might openly engage with the level of
a work’s achievement. Specifically, they embrace the creativity
component of originality as a meaningful tool by which to yield
a more optimal level of socially valuable works—even if the
policy behind that Court-created tool has not been clearly
elucidated.218 For Professor Zimmerman, for example, Feist,
through its insistence upon a modicum of creativity, can be
read as a corrective halt on the tradition of expansive readings
of originality under Bleistein, under which “if it is not copied, it
is original.”219 She proposes that perhaps a more exacting
approach to the application of the originality doctrine, as a
proxy for quality, is called for.220
This suggestion is taken up in the scholarship of
Professors Joseph Miller and Jeffrey Harrison. These scholars
explicitly argue for a heightened creativity demonstration—
that is, something above and beyond what is required now for
the full panoply of copyright rights to attach—that could be
brought about by a modified legal test or a modified application
of the present one. The precise proposals vary in the specifics
but share core commonalities. Drawing on the “nonobviousness”
requirement in patent law, Miller would premise an originality
determination on the degree to which a work is a “departure
from that which is conventional, routine, or pedestrian” in the
particular genre.221 Harrison proffers a “modicum-times-2”
standard that would require “more than minimal expertise,
skill, taste, or judgment” and that the work “be capable of being
distinguished from other ordinary objects.”222 He would also
adapt the concept of authorship to require some degree of
“preconception.”223
These proposals aim to remedy two types of perceived
ills. The first set of harms consists of a range of costs imposed
by copyright. It is widely acknowledged that copyright has
permeated many facets of life in the digital age; this
218

Zimmerman, supra note 17, at 206.
Id. at 202.
220
Id. at 212. For a comparison of the application of originality standards in
non-U.S. jurisdictions, see Elizabeth F. Judge & Daniel Gervais, Of Silos and
Constellations: Comparing Notions of Originality in Copyright Law, 27 CARDOZO ARTS
& ENT. L.J. 375 (2009).
221
Miller, supra note 10, at 477; id. at 464, 486-87.
222
Harrison, supra note 10, at 867 (internal quotation marks omitted).
223
Id. at 859.
219
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phenomenon both hovers as a perpetual threat of liability for
downstream users and may deter would-be authors.224 Likewise,
it is argued, copyright litigants do not internalize the full cost of
disputes that are often of purely private significance with little
associated public benefit of the sort copyright was designed to
promote.225 A heightened threshold for originality would address
these problems by reining in—up front—the number of works
that become subject to copyright in the first place.
The second type of harm addressed in this scholarship is
a structural weakness. The current regime, it is said, does not
incentivize the creation of the optimal number of truly original
works since authors likely “aim low” in their creative endeavors
as a result of the minimal creativity demanded of them.226 The
modifications proposed, they contend, would have the salubrious
effect of encouraging authors to achieve greater creative heights
(to thereby advance knowledge and learning) and, at the same
time, would more readily justify the social costs of awarding the
full slate of copyright exclusions and penalties.
These proposals raise important policy questions, which
will be evaluated for their potential effects at the time of a
work’s creation and at the time of enforcement.
1. Effects at the Time of Creation
The proposals described above embrace an incentivebased theory of copyright with an added twist: not only can
copyright encourage the creation of works in the neighborhood
of being creative,227 but manipulation of the quantum of
creativity required will affect the level of creativity achieved.
The implicit idea is that anxiety about whether a particular work
would be protected, or the extent of its protection, will propel
artists to reach for greater heights. And, having reached these
heights, copyright would reward them for their achievements.
As an initial matter, there is reason to question the
proposition that artists aim low because the originality
threshold is low. The scholars advocating this position present
224

Id. at 859 & n.41; Miller, supra note 10, at 457-59, 464, 466-68; see also
Parchomovsky & Stein, supra note 17, at 1508, 1518-20.
225
Harrison, supra note 10, at 855-56 (distinguishing between distributive
and allocative interests); see also Parchomovsky & Stein, supra note 17, at 1512, 1518.
226
Harrison, supra note 10, at 857-58, 873-77; Parchomovsky & Stein, supra
note 17, at 1506, 1517; cf. Miller, supra note 10, at 463-64.
227
Cf. Cohen, supra note 74, at 1152 (noting the distinction between creativity
and mere production); Harrison, supra note 10, at 865, 872 (same).
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no evidence that this is the case. With respect to the current
professional photography market, moreover, there is reason to
believe that financial considerations exert their own pressures
on photographers to produce high quality works of authorship.
Many sectors of the professional photography industry are
undergoing significant structural change, with the traditional
business models no longer seen as viable.228 In the face of pools of
talented amateur photographers, stock houses that accumulate
and supply low-cost, serviceable photographs for many needs, and
reduced opportunities for paid work in the print media, market
forces already encourage photographers to distinguish themselves
creatively in order to attract clients and paying work.229
Furthermore, even assuming that a ratcheting up of the
originality requirement would alter the behavior of authors, we
should exercise caution in constructing a system in which
adherence to a copyright rule is a foremost consideration
during the process of artistic creation.230 Authors must already
be increasingly conscious of one thread of copyright—the need
to steer clear of infringement. There is a serious question about
whether the further shaping of primary behavior through this
sort of legal rule is desirable.231 It is possible to have too much
creativity; strange and radical departures from convention,
undertaken merely for the sake of ensuring copyright
protection, do not necessarily advance science and learning to
the optimal degree.232
228

The comments are legion. See, e.g., Neil Burgess, For God’s Sake, Somebody
Call It!, EPUK (Aug. 1, 2010), http://www.epuk.org/Opinion/961/for-gods-sake-somebodycall-it; David Jolly, Lament for a Dying Field: Photojournalism, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10,
2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/10/business/media/10photo.html; Jay Kinghorn,
Rethinking Your Business Model, STRICTLY BUSINESS BLOG (May 25, 2011),
http://www.asmp.org/strictlybusiness; Holly Stuart Hughes & Conor Risch, How Art
Buyers Find Photographers Now, PHOTO DISTRICT NEWS, Jan. 2010, at 36; Thomas
Werner, Photography Isn’t Dead, The Business Model Is, STRICTLY BUSINESS BLOG (May
27, 2011), http://www.asmp.org/strictlybusiness.
229
See, e.g., Stephanie Clifford, For Photographers, the Image of a Shrinking
Path, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/30/business/media/
30photogs.html (describing financial pressures on established professional photography
paths).
230
I want to thank Kathryn Judge for her helpful insight on this point.
231
Parchomovsky and Stein argue that a benefit to their proposal of a tiered
system under which the most original works would receive both the greatest freedom
from liability in drawing upon preexisting works and also the strongest rights to
pursue downstream infringement, is that it “will prompt authors to focus on the
originality factor.” Parchomovsky & Stein, supra note 17, at 1517.
232
See Jeanne C. Fromer, A Psychology of Intellectual Property, 104 NW. U. L.
REV. 1441, 1479-83 (2010) (arguing that with respect to artistic endeavors, society
generally tolerates less “newness” than it does with respect to scientific endeavors);
Madison, supra note 10, at 823 (“More—more creativity, more creative goods, more
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2. Effects at the Time of Litigation
Even setting aside the degree to which changing the
legal standard might distort artistic production, the proposals
raise the related issue of the desirable level of uncertainty that
accompanies an infringement suit. As this article has argued,
Feist does contain the seed of an approach to copyright under
which the absence of guaranteed protection serves as a check
on the system. By ruling out blanket protection for any
medium, including photography, the opinion does inject some
degree of uncertainty into copyright litigation—albeit
uncertainty that typically can be remedied by an appropriate
accompanying narrative or comparative evidence of originality.
By contrast, the proposals of Miller and Harrison to
raise the originality threshold would introduce a greater level
of uncertainty into the current litigation regime. This
uncertainty would result from an increased lack of
predictability as to whether a work was creative enough to
merit copyright protection at all. Given the elusiveness of
originality as a legal concept, the notion that the system could
rationally articulate what is pedestrian or what is especially
original—without deferring to the internal preferences of the
decision maker—is difficult to comprehend.
Miller offers the example of a CT-scanned photograph of
a rubber duck toy—“radiology art”—as the sort of thing
copyright should protect in contrast to the Obama Photograph.233
Professors Gideon Parchomovsky and Alex Stein cite Alice
Randall’s book The Wind Done Gone as the kind of work they
view as highly original.234 But no principled basis for these
determinations is clearly delineated. Furthermore, producing an
attractive, high quality work where the range of authorial
discretion is narrow—such as, perhaps, a press photograph at a
political event—may support, rather than undermine, a claim of
originality. For, many authorial decisions have often contributed
to even a seemingly mundane photograph.235
creators—is not necessarily better; more is merely different.”); Parchomovsky & Stein,
supra note 17, at 1522 (“We do not dispute that originality has an optimal amount.”).
233
See Miller, supra note 10, at 491 (“It strikes me, at the outset, as
unconventional expression (in great contrast to Mr. Garcia’s photo of then-Senator
Obama).”).
234
Parchomovsky & Stein, supra note 17, at 1529-31 (asserting that Randall’s
book is “brimming with originality” and that the author “attempted—successfully—to
break new literary ground”).
235
See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 214. Photographer Ryan Matthew
Smith’s images for a new book on culinary techniques involved a series of creative decisions:
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In any event, as this article has argued throughout,
unless the system is revised explicitly to permit aesthetic
judgments by courts on the originality question,236 courts will
continue to use proxies for that assessment. Thus, rather than
necessarily yielding a better crop of creative works, a heightened
standard is likely to promote more elaborate narratives and
more controversies over the appropriate comparative specimens
offered in a litigation setting. This, if anything, is likely to result
in more outcomes determined by judicial subjectivity.
Two additional reasons exist for enforcing, but not
heightening, the requirement for originality. These will be
taken up in the remaining subsections. The first is that the
proposals to raise the requirement do not take full account of
the way in which originality already functions—at the level of
scope of protection—to allow downstream authors to operate, to
a meaningful degree, free from the reach of an earlier
photographer’s copyright. The second is that heightening the
originality threshold inadvertently may cause economically
sustaining work to evaporate; if this is the case, creative
endeavors—the sort that Miller, Harrison, Parchomovsky, and
Stein would like to incentivize—that depend on that income
may not come to fruition.
C.

Scope of Protection Safety Valve

One argument sometimes proffered against protecting
photographs of common scenes or mundane items is that the
copyright holder will then be in a position to harass others who

The project required Smith to figure out creative ways to shoot a wide range
of subjects. His shots of root crops growing underground were inspired by
drawings of tree root structures he had seen. He also made those images by
combining multiple shots. The challenges were keeping the lighting
consistent, and propping up greens with toothpicks and tweezers as they
wilted under the lights, Smith says. For the images of liquids and pours, he
used Broncolor 3200 w/s strobes (and power packs) capable of firing at
1/9000th of a second, and some trial and error. “Getting the perfect splash or
pour is all about timing,” he says, explaining that he often threw some liquid
with one hand and triggered his camera and strobes with the other.
David Walker, Picture Story: An Accidental Adventure in Food Photography, PHOTO
DISTRICT NEWS (May 25, 2011), http://www.pdnonline.com/pdn/features/Picture-StoryAn-Ac-2932.shtml.
236
As mentioned above, a number of scholars have argued that courts are
already engaging in aesthetic determinations, even if the courts are not labeling them
as such. See supra note 30.
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independently photograph similar subjects.237 For example,
several circuit courts have expressed concern that product
manufacturers licensing the production of derivative works
could find themselves prevented from the further licensing of—
and possibly even liable for the infringement of—photographs
of their own copyrighted works.238 To defuse this potential
problem, courts must be rigorous in circumscribing the
conditions under which a defendant can be held liable for
staging and/or shooting a similar scene.239
Striking the right balance in the infringement context is
crucial since the principles derived from these cases could affect
the copyright status of the billions of unlitigated photographs
that depict common scenes and setups. Given the highly
representational nature of photography,240 the notion that the
average snapshot in front of the Statue of Liberty might
theoretically infringe a similar photograph seen elsewhere by
the snap-shooter would not be an ideal copyright policy. Aware
of what rests in the balance, courts already perform reasonably
well in determining whether two different, but similar,
photographs lead to a determination of infringement of one by
the other.
1. General Principles
The seminal Supreme Court decisions do not provide
direct guidance on how close a subsequent photograph may
come to an earlier photograph since they addressed threshold
copyrightability problems. Once it was decided that Sarony’s
photograph was original, no further work was undertaken to

237

Custom Dynamics, LLC v. Radiantz LED Lighting, Inc., 535 F. Supp. 2d
542, 549 (E.D.N.C. 2008) (expressing concern that finding photographs copyrightable
would allow plaintiff to “corner the market on advertising aftermarket motorcycle
lighting accessories by copyrighting purely descriptive pictures of its wares”); Oriental
Art Printing, Inc. v. Goldstar Printing Corp., 175 F. Supp. 2d 542, 548 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)
(subsequent history omitted); see also Ginsburg, supra note 148, at 1077 (discussing
this argument).
238
Entm’t Research Grp. v. Genesis Creative Grp., 122 F.3d 1211, 1224 (9th
Cir. 1997); Gracen v. Bradford Exch., 698 F.2d 300, 303-04 (7th Cir. 1983); Durham
Indus., Inc. v. Tomy Corp., 630 F.2d 905, 910-11 (2d Cir. 1980).
239
SHL Imaging, Inc. v. Artisan House, Inc., 117 F. Supp. 2d 301, 311
(S.D.N.Y. 2000); cf. Gorman, supra note 9, at 1591-92, 1598-99 (discussing distinction
between exact duplication and re-staging).
240
See GAINES, supra note 46, at 67 (contrasting written composition and
photography and remarking that “two different men may very well produce identical
photographs using the same apparatus identically positioned”).
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probe the nature of the defendant’s 85,000 lithographic
copies—they were infringing.

The Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co.’s lithograph,
Courtesy of the Library of Congress

The Court was not asked to decide, for example,
whether another photographer would have been permitted to
pose and photograph Oscar Wilde in a similar fashion or how
close such a subsequent photograph could have come to
Sarony’s image before it infringed.241

241

This did not prevent the defendant in Burrow-Giles from making an
argument, along these lines, that should the Court affirm the copyrightability of the
photograph, Oscar Wilde would not be permitted to hire a painter to paint him in a
similar setting. See Statement and Brief for Plaintiff in Error at 15, Burrow-Giles
Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53 (1884) (No. 1071).
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The general consensus is that exact reconstruction of an
earlier copyrighted photograph is infringement.242 How should a
court determine if a subsequent photograph infringes an earlier
one? While there is a gray area here, courts are better equipped
institutionally to decide this question—of whether a later
photograph appropriated original material from an earlier one—
than the first-order originality status of the earlier one; after all,
courts are institutions designed to balance and compare.243
Proxies play a role at this phase of litigation as well.
Comparative techniques are clearly at the heart of the
infringement analysis. But even authorial narrative may help
to define the scope of protection to which a copyright plaintiff’s
work is entitled. Sahuc v. Tucker, for example, involved two
photographs of the St. Louis Cathedral at Jackson Square in
New Orleans and the claim that the later one infringed the
earlier one.244 The plaintiff proffered a narrative about the way
he sought a “spectral,” “mysterious,” and “timeless” quality of
the setting in his black-and-white photo.245 He testified that “‘it
all works,’ that there is ‘no one thing’ and ‘all of the elements’
are important.”246 According to the court, however, that
narrative sufficiently departed from the second photographer’s
testimony that he photographed in color so as to provide the
“viewer with more information.”247 The second photograph
focused primarily on the Cathedral as its “center of interest,”
aiming to capture it “under optimum conditions” and to provide
a visual path of “rising up.”248 Taking all of this into account,

242

See 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 31, § 2.08[E][2]; Malkan, supra note
143, at 446. The court in SHL Imaging suggested that certain reconstructions would
constitute infringing derivative works. See 117 F. Supp. 2d at 306 (remarking that
“[r]e-shooting an earlier photographic work with some alteration of the expressive
elements is an[] example” of derivative authorship since “the nature of photographic
authorship would have been recast, adapted, or transformed”).
243
Cf. Malkan, supra note 143, at 448 (questioning how one should assess the
respective contributions to an image of a beautiful subject matter as between the first
photographer and any subsequent photographers and suggesting that it is the “level of
original authorship in the earliest photograph [that] is the wild card”).
244
300 F. Supp. 2d 461, 463 (E.D. La. 2004) (subsequent history omitted).
245
Id. at 463, 465. (The court does not use quotation marks with respect to
these descriptions, but does cite the plaintiff as the source of them.)
246
Id. at 465 (quoting plaintiff).
247
Id. at 466. (The court does not use quotation marks with respect to this
description, but does cite the defendant as the source of them.). Coming closer to the
plaintiff’s narrative, the defendant also described his photo as “ethereal, unearthly,
spiritual, and mysterious.” Id. (The court does not use quotation marks with respect to
these descriptions, but does cite the defendant as the source of them.)
248
Id. (quoting defendant) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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the court held that there was no infringement.249 Accordingly,
reliance on a plaintiff’s narrative account of originality does not
necessarily entail a victory for the plaintiff.
Recent case law and scholarship, however, have
questioned the utility of some of the tools courts use to perform
this kind of analysis. These tools, however, are essential to
upholding the principles of Feist. Although the precise
formulation of the test for copyright infringement varies among
the circuits and in different contexts, copyright protection is
generally available only to the extent that the allegedly
infringing work is substantially similar to the protectable
original elements in the earlier work.250 Two doctrines operate to
limit the scope of a work’s protection: merger and scènes à faire.251
The merger doctrine is an extension of the
idea/expression dichotomy, under which copyright protection
applies only to the expression of ideas, not to the ideas
themselves.252 The merger doctrine takes this notion to its
logical conclusion: if an idea can be expressed in only one way,
then the expression of that idea is said to merge with the
idea.253 In such a case, the expression cannot be protected by
copyright because it would give an author a monopoly on the
underlying idea.254 Accordingly, others may freely copy merged
249

Id. at 467.
See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991) (“To
establish infringement, two elements must be proven: (1) ownership of a valid
copyright, and (2) copying of constituent elements of the work that are original.”); see,
e.g., Peter F. Gaito Architecture, LLC v. Simone Dev. Corp., 602 F.3d 57, 63 (2d Cir.
2010) (setting out substantial similarity test).
251
Although I discuss these doctrines at the scope of protection phase, in some
circuits they are invoked at the copyrightability phase. See generally Andrew B. Hebl,
A Heavy Burden: Proper Application of Copyright’s Merger and Scenes a Faire
Doctrines, 8 WAKE FOREST INTELL. PROP. L.J. 128 (2007) (analyzing the treatment of
these doctrines, and the corresponding burdens of proof, across the circuits). It is not
uncommon to see the doctrines invoked where, as discussed above, a defendant has
challenged the plaintiff’s work as garden variety. See, e.g., Schrock v. Learning Curve
Int’l, Inc., 586 F.3d 513, 522 n.5 (7th Cir. 2009); Oriental Art Printing, Inc. v. Goldstar
Printing Corp., 175 F. Supp. 2d 542, 547 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (subsequent history
omitted).
252
17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006).
253
Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 707-08 (2d Cir.
1992); Concrete Mach. Co. v. Classic Lawn Ornaments, Inc., 843 F.2d 600, 606 (1st Cir.
1988). Articulation of the rule, however, is far easier than the application of it. As
Professor Hughes puts it, “the doctrine’s indeterminacy comes from trying to apply an
either/or dichotomy—with draconian implications—to a multilayered world.” Hughes,
supra note 15, at 91.
254
Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738, 742 (9th Cir.
1971); Michael D. Murray, Copyright, Originality, and the End of the Scènes à Faire
and Merger Doctrines for Visual Works, 58 BAYLOR L. REV. 779, 788 (2006) (citing
Educ. Testing Servs. v. Katzman, 793 F.2d 533, 539 (3d Cir. 1986)).
250
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expression. To illustrate, the First Circuit upheld the
application of the merger doctrine in an infringement dispute
over candle fragrance labels in which the defendantcompetitor’s photographs of eucalyptus, cranberry, and other
vegetation were similar to those of the plaintiff.255 It explained
that “there were few associated expressions, of which the most
obvious was a realistic representation of the fruit or flower at
issue” and that the defendant could use “the same subject
matter on its labels, even if the genesis for [its] choice of
subject matter was [the plaintiff’s] labels.”256
The scènes à faire doctrine has come to refer to stock
phrases, events, themes, and characters that are commonly
employed in the context of a particular kind of work, such as
“the cars in a car chase, the kiss in a love scene, [or] the dive
bombers in a movie about Pearl Harbor.”257 There are several
purposes undergirding this doctrine. First, there is a fairness
argument that stock themes and conventions belong in the
public domain.258 Another purpose is evidentiary; given their
prevalence in the culture, it would be impossible, in a copyright
infringement case, to determine whether one work had copied
from another or had simply drawn upon familiar human
experiences.259 Finally, scènes à faire are seen as “essential to
the presentation of the subject matter of [a] work” and
accordingly lack originality.260 Some scholars have described
255

Yankee Candle Co. v. Bridgewater Candle Co., 259 F.3d 25, 32 n.1 (1st Cir.

2001).
256

Id. at 36. However, the court discerned limitations in the merger doctrine’s
application to this case, where there were “sufficient details in th[e] photographs to
make them unique.” Id. According to the court, the merger doctrine would not have
allowed the defendant to scan the plaintiff’s labels into a computer and “reproduce[]
them exactly,” and it might also have prevented the defendant from taking its own
photographs of the photographic subjects arranged “nearly identical[ly]” to the
plaintiff’s arrangement. Id.
257
Bucklew v. Hawkins, Ash, Baptie & Co., 329 F.3d 923, 929 (7th Cir. 2003).
258
See Scott-Blanton v. Universal City Studios Prods. LLLP, 539 F. Supp. 2d
191, 201 (D.D.C. 2008) (“Indeed, the public domain would have a scant selection if
stock settings such as the movie theatre, the kitchen, Las Vegas, a church picnic or a
club were subject to copyright protection.”); Murray, supra note 254, at 794 (citing
several cases).
259
See Lichtman, supra note 15, at 739; Murray, supra note 254, at 794.
260
Murray, supra note 254, at 794. Note, however, that some view scènes à
faire as protectable expression and others do not. Compare Murray Hill Publ’ns, Inc. v.
Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 361 F.3d 312, 319 (6th Cir. 2004) (“[E]xpressions
not protectible because they follow directly from unprotectible ideas are known as
scènes à faire . . . .”), with Taylor Corp. v. Four Seasons Greetings, LLC, 315 F.3d 1039,
1042-43 (8th Cir. 2003) (“Labeling certain stock elements as ‘scènes à faire’ does not
imply that they are uncopyrightable; it merely states that similarity between plaintiff’s
and defendant’s works that are limited to hackneyed elements cannot furnish the basis
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scènes à faire as “infrastructural, for they constitute the
‘elements of creation, a vocabulary needed to create a work.’”261
The scènes à faire doctrine often serves as a convenient
catch-all of elements, without sufficient attention paid to the
nature of the element as it relates to the genre of work under
consideration. This is particularly true in the case of
photography. Some courts seem prepared to invoke this
doctrine, but to limit consideration of it to what may be thought
of as the “plot” of the photograph, that is, to those aspects that
relate to what the photograph purports to be about. For
example, one court identified the portrayal of a dancer’s motion
and dress, associated with a traditional type of dance, as scènes
à faire.262 In another case, where two photographs of the same
dinosaur fossil were shot surrounded by sand, the court held
that sand was a scène à faire in that “it is the obvious choice of
background for the [f]ossil.”263
In order to translate this doctrine to the photographic
context, however, courts should consider the stock and trade
elements of photography. In particular, if, as is frequently
stated, creativity in photography relates more to the depiction
of subject matter than to any claim to the photographic subject
itself, then defendants should be permitted to adopt any angle,
lighting, or composition technique that is routinely used in
professional photography without fear of infringement. Some
courts have signaled that they are willing to take such choices
into consideration when adjudicating alleged infringement. In
one dispute, where the two fashion photographs at issue each
portrayed a woman’s legs and handbag in a bathroom stall, the
court was inclined to include as scènes à faire some of the
choices traditionally associated with photography, such as
angle and focus:
[I]t is standard for the photographer to take such a photograph from
or near the floor, and it follows that a portion of the floor closest to
the camera might be out of focus. A natural consequence of that
positioning is also, often, a head-on view of the toilet. In addition, a

for finding substantial similarity.” (citing 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 31,
§ 13.03[B]4 at 13-75)).
261
Peter Lee, The Evolution of Intellectual Infrastructure, 83 WASH. L. REV.
39, 61 (2008) (quoting Leslie A. Kurtz, Copyright: The Scènes à Faire Doctrine, 41 FLA.
L. REV. 79, 114 (1989)).
262
Reece v. Island Treasures Art Gallery, Inc., 468 F. Supp. 2d 1197, 1207 (D.
Haw. 2006).
263
Psihoyos v. Nat’l Geographic Soc’y, 409 F. Supp. 2d 268, 275 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
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photographer of such a scene would generally want the fashion and
model to be in sharp focus.264

2. Critiques
The application of these doctrines to visual works,
including photography, is not without controversy.265 In the
Mannion opinion discussed above,266 Judge Kaplan questioned
the applicability of the idea/expression and merger principles to
visual works.267 He reasoned that “it is not clear that there is
any real distinction between the idea in a work of [visual] art
and its expression. An artist’s idea, among other things, is to
depict a particular subject in a particular way.”268
Relatedly, Professor Michael Murray argues that
merger and scènes à faire, while well suited to literary works,
are ill suited to the realm of visual works and should play no
part in the infringement analysis of such works.269 The
doctrines are a “great curse” in the visual arts, he claims,
because their application rests on the “fallacy . . . [t]hat an idea
of a visual work and the expression of the idea can merge, or
that artists must copy a standard image in order to depict an
idea.”270 Specifically, in the literary context, he acknowledges
that the doctrines operate to safeguard the public domain from
the “excessively broad enforcement” of rights at a level of
abstraction “beyond [the] actual words.”271 In the visual arts
context, by contrast, infringement “is much more often based
on a claim of literal or actual copying; no abstraction of the
work is required, and, therefore, there is no need to
circumscribe the scope of plaintiff’s work to protect the public

264

Bill Diodato Photography, LLC v. Kate Spade, LLC, 388 F. Supp. 2d 382, 392
(S.D.N.Y. 2005) (internal citation omitted); see also Oriental Art Printing, Inc. v. Goldstar
Printing Corp., 175 F. Supp. 2d 542, 547 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (subsequent history omitted)
(noting that “each of the potentially protectable elements, i.e. the photographs’ lighting,
angle, and the choice of plates, flow necessarily from the subject matter of the
photographs, i.e. the realistic depiction of most common Chinese food dishes”).
265
Hon. Jon O. Newman, New Lyrics for an Old Melody: The Idea/Expression
Dichotomy in the Computer Age, 17 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 691, 697-98 (1999)
(critiquing the application of doctrines applicable in one medium to others, including
the abstraction analysis applicable to literary texts to visual works).
266
See supra Part II.D.1.
267
Mannion v. Coors Brewing Co., 377 F. Supp. 2d 444, 455-56 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
268
Id. at 458.
269
Murray, supra note 254, at 784.
270
Id. at 848.
271
Id. at 849.

1546

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 76:4

domain from an expansive protection of abstractions of
plaintiff’s work.”272
Murray appears to differ from Judge Kaplan on whether
the idea/expression dichotomy makes sense as applied to visual
works. While generally supporting Judge Kaplan’s view, which
limits the application of the idea/expression, merger, and
scènes à faire doctrines, Murray identifies the idea/expression
dichotomy as a safety valve in his attack on the other two
doctrines. Specifically, he states that “[t]o the extent that the
idea of certain images is in the public domain, they are free for
use whether characterized as scènes à faire or simply themes
and ideas.”273 In this sense, unlike Judge Kaplan, he seems to
contemplate that it is possible, if difficult, to separate an idea
from its visual representation. Where they share common
ground is in their agreement that it is possible to express
oneself visually in a myriad of ways.
For Judge Kaplan, the upshot is that later artists
should not be able to appropriate the original aspects of a work
and avoid an infringement determination by pleading “shared
idea.” This view is undercut, however, by the irrefutable fact
that the idea/expression dichotomy is a basic concept around
which infringement is assessed.274 Photography is generally a
highly representational art form, and there would seem to be
no reason why courts should not use the traditional modes of
analysis to assist in the infringement inquiry. Photographs
implementing similar ideas are bound to look more alike than
hand-painted canvases doing the same, but that does not mean
that photography should be closed off to the free use of ideas.
For his part, Murray is concerned that most
infringement suits in the visual arts involve “literal or actual
copying.”275 He argues, therefore, that there is less of a role for
abstraction to play, and thus less of a need to constrain an
earlier artist’s monopoly over abstractions. Without
diminishing Murray’s comprehensive survey of merger and
272

Id.
Id. at 794.
274
This is the case even if, as Professor Amy Cohen argues, the dichotomy boils
down to aesthetic judgment in the final analysis. See generally Cohen, supra note 30.
275
Murray, supra note 254, at 849. By this, he explains, he means more than
duplication by “photo-mechanical means such as photographing, photocopying, or
scanning”; he would also include the direct copying by hand of a visual work, among
other things. Unfortunately, Murray does not explain what would constitute “literal or
actual copying” in the photographic context, though he does acknowledge the
imprecision of these terms. Id. at 849 n.455.
273
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scènes à faire in the visual arts, a fair number of the disputes
in the context of photography in fact do involve some kind of
subsequent arrangement and photographing of similar subject
matters rather than copy-and-paste duplication.276 In such
cases, Murray’s views are not persuasive.
At their core, the idea/expression, merger, and scènes à
faire doctrines are useful tools in assessing the scope of
protection to which an earlier photograph is entitled.277 In part,
this is because of the nature of the photographic medium; given
the likely similarity between two photographs of the same
subject matter, reliance on these doctrines is essential to
ensuring—if we are truly committed to the principle—that
successive photographers are free to try their hands at similar
material. In part, this is also because of the nature of the
disputes that often arise over photographs. Where a product
manufacturer enlists a second photographer to photograph its
products—rather than engage in infringement through
continued use of an earlier photographer’s work beyond the
contractual terms—it must have reasonable latitude to proceed
without threat of a suit by the earlier photographer. In these
cases, where there may be little room for variety in how a
product is shot, the idea/expression, merger, and scènes à faire
doctrines can assist in assuring fluid marketing and
advertising practices. In such cases, these doctrines, along with
276

See, e.g., Yankee Candle Co. v. Bridgewater Candle Co., 259 F.3d 25 (1st
Cir. 2001); Ets-Hokin v. Skyy Spirits, Inc., 225 F.3d 1068 (9th Cir. 2000) (subsequent
history omitted); Leigh v. Warner Bros., Inc., 212 F.3d 1210 (11th Cir. 2000); Leibovitz
v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 137 F.3d 109 (2d Cir. 1998); Gross v. Seligman, 212 F.
930 (2d Cir. 1914); Masterson Mktg., Inc. v. KSL Recreation Corp., 495 F. Supp. 2d
1044 (S.D. Cal. 2007); Straus v. DVC Worldwide, Inc., 484 F. Supp. 2d 620 (S.D. Tex.
2007); Reece v. Island Treasures Art Gallery, Inc., 468 F. Supp. 2d 1197 (D. Haw.
2006); Psihoyos v. Nat’l Geographic Soc’y, 409 F. Supp. 2d 268 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); Bill
Diodato Photography, LLC v. Kate Spade, LLC, 388 F. Supp. 2d 382 (S.D.N.Y. 2005);
Mannion v. Coors Brewing Co., 377 F. Supp. 2d 444 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); Sahuc v. Tucker,
300 F. Supp. 2d 461 (E.D. La. 2004); Gentieu v. Tony Stone Images/Chicago, Inc., 255
F. Supp. 2d 838 (N.D. Ill. 2003); Fournier v. Erickson, 202 F. Supp. 2d 290 (S.D.N.Y.
2002); Kaplan v. Stock Market Photo Agency, Inc., 133 F. Supp. 2d 317 (S.D.N.Y.
2001); Pampered Chef, Ltd. v. Magic Kitchen, Inc., 12 F. Supp. 2d 785 (N.D. Ill. 1998);
Caratzas v. Time Life, Inc., No. 92 Civ. 6346, 1992 WL 322033 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 23, 1992);
Kisch v. Ammirati & Puris Inc., 657 F. Supp. 380 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
277
Parchomovsky and Stein argue that “[c]opyright law fails to take the next
step [beyond the threshold inquiry into originality] and calibrate the scope of the
copyright protection to the degree of the work’s originality.” Parchomovsky & Stein,
supra note 17, at 1506. The three doctrines discussed in this section, however, are
important tools that serve to promote that calibration even under the current system.
See Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Response: Tiered Originality and the Dualism of
Copyright Incentives, 95 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 67, 75-76 (2009) (discussing doctrine of
thin copyright in this capacity).
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proof of engagement of a second photographer and the
specifications given to the second photographer, should be
sufficient—as long as they do not advocate copying—to defend
against an infringement charge.278 This approach likewise
coheres with our basic intuitions that amateur snapshot takers
should have wide berth to shoot familiar scenes without being
deemed copyright infringers.
D.

Structure of Copyright, Creation, and Career

The remaining question is whether a heightened
originality threshold would yield more creative output from
creators. As argued above, it would be difficult, if not
impossible, under the system as it currently stands to
determine how such output would be measured. And, it is far
from clear that we would want courts to play that role. But
even if one were to defer to Miller’s, Harrison’s, and
Parchomovsky and Stein’s view of what heightened creative
output might consist of, it is important to consider whether
raising the level of originality required for protection might
actually decrease the level of creativity achieved by authors
because of how the relevant professional industries are
structured. Photography is a case in point.
For example, if protection for photographs of common
commercial and industrial items is eliminated as a
consequence of ratcheting up the originality threshold,
rampant copying of photographs may begin to occur in the
ordinary course of business. In the recent Fragrancenet.com
case, some 900 images of perfume bottles were alleged to have
been copied outright.279 As displayed on its website,280
Fragrancenet.com’s images appear professionally and
attractively rendered and, if they are made legally available for
the taking, there is every reason to expect that many
competing perfume retailers will simply copy the images of the
bottles and attempt to attract customers by reducing prices or
278

Cf. Malkan, supra note 143, at 452 (suggesting that if the district court in
SHL Imaging was correct that “[p]ractically, the plaintiff’s works are only protected
from verbatim copying,” then “a product owner evidently would be permitted to
intentionally reconstruct a copyrighted photograph of the product, even borrowing the
same lighting techniques and creative details (like the blue sky reflection in the
mirrors), as long as the second photograph was discernible from the first” (internal
footnote, emphasis, and quotation marks omitted)).
279
FragranceNet.com, Inc. v. FragranceX.com, Inc., 679 F. Supp. 2d 312, 315
(E.D.N.Y. 2010).
280
http://www.fragrancenet.com (last visited Feb. 12, 2011).
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altering other visual elements on their own websites. No
perfume bottle would need to be photographed twice.
Such a consequence may not prove troubling to many.
Indeed, Professor Miller states that “unconventional . . . expression
does more to advance knowledge and learning than does
pedestrian, convention-bound expression.”281 While Miller’s views of
the ultimate aims of copyright are unobjectionable, the means he
advances—potentially eliminating protection for the arguably
“pedestrian,” such as standard photographs of perfume
bottles—might prove self-defeating. The reason, at least with
respect to professional photography, is the nature of the
financial arrangements undergirding creative endeavors.
Specifically,
even
assuming
some
commercial
photographs—of motorcycle parts, rubber doorstop covers, and
ceramic plates for catalogs, advertisements, and magazine
covers—may not represent the best of what the Constitution’s
Framers had in mind for the copyright system that would be
established, many professional photographers, who are often
freelancers, rely upon income from these sorts of images to
support the challenging, creative, and artistic work they do.282
Thus, the key role that these “orthodox” images play in support
of “original” work, and the fact that they continue to be copied
and litigated, may weigh against Miller’s view that
“unorthodox creative expression has greater need of protection
against purely imitative copying”283 even if we agree that the
increased production of “unorthodox creative expression” is in
fact an ultimate goal of copyright.
This interconnected business model is not new. In a
well-known
handbook,
Best
Business
Practices
for
Photographers, photographer John Harrington acknowledges
the second-class status that commercial work assumes for

281

Miller, supra note 10, at 464.
See, e.g., MICHAL HERON, CREATIVE CAREERS IN PHOTOGRAPHY: MAKING A
LIVING WITH OR WITHOUT A CAMERA 45, 92, 99 (2007) (noting that a number of
photographers have made hybrid careers in both the commercial and fine art
photography markets and that “assignments can pay for the personal work which often
is undertaken with the photographer’s own finances”) (quoting interview with
photographer Joyce Tenneson); Clifford, supra note 229 (describing freelance
photojournalist Matt Eich who “has been supplementing magazine work with
advertising and art projects, in a pastiche of ways to earn a living”); Paula Lerner, An
Open Letter to Students Contemplating Photojournalism, DIGITAL JOURNALIST (Dec.
2002), http://www.digitaljournalist.org/issue0212/lerner.html (describing different
methods of supporting creative photography pursuits).
283
Miller, supra note 10, at 464.
282
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some.284 But, he cites Ansel Adams and Richard Avedon as
photographers who were able to pursue creative projects based
upon the income streams generated from commercial work.285
These sorts of personal projects constitute work, it is
submitted, that the scholars identified earlier might be more
inclined to support through copyright. For example, Bostonbased photographer Paula Lerner has financed several trips to
photograph and interview women in Afghanistan—
photojournalistic work that recently was honored with an
Emmy Award—by accepting commercial assignments in the
United States.286 A New York-based food photographer
interviewed for this article stated that while the stylish and
artistic images posted on her website at times might be too
unique to be used for a commercial job, whether it be advertising
or food packaging, they project a sense of style that attracts
paying clients for commercial work, which in turn permits her to
continue developing a portfolio of personally-driven work that is
made freely available for public viewing on her website.287 This
sentiment is echoed by photographer Kevin Arnold:
I believe strongly in the value of personal projects. As a commercial
photographer, I get to do some great work on assignment, but the
fact is that a lot of that work ends up getting watered down in terms
of creativity. Even clients who appreciate good imagery have to cover
their basis. They are usually spending a lot of money and need to
make sure they tick off all the boxes—having the right product used
by the right demographic in the right environment. In the end, the
imagery can be good, but it is rarely something the [sic] pushes your
creative boundaries. I find that clients will hire you to do the work
you love, but they need to see it first. Convincing a potential client to
284

JOHN HARRINGTON, BEST BUSINESS PRACTICES FOR PHOTOGRAPHERS (2d

ed. 2010).
285

Id. at xxvii-xxix; see also JANET MALCOLM, Men Without Props, in DIANA &
NIKON: ESSAYS ON PHOTOGRAPHY 42 (expanded ed. 1997) (noting Richard Avedon’s
“corollary career” as a serious portrait photographer). Although she critiques the
incentives theory of copyright in a recent article, Professor Zimmerman concedes that
“[c]ommon sense . . . suggests that people will be able to spend less time, overall,
producing copyrightable works if they have no prospect of being able to support
themselves, either directly or indirectly, from this kind of work.” Diane Leenheer
Zimmerman, Copyright as Incentives: Did We Just Imagine That?, 12 THEORETICAL
INQUIRIES L. 29, 47 (2011). And she notes that “certain works [such as ‘potboiler’ bodicerippers] are probably produced almost entirely because they are expected to generate a
good return on the investment.” Id. at 47-48.
286
See, e.g., Paula Lerner, The Life and Death of Sitara Achakzai, THE WORLD
(July 29, 2009), http://www.theworld.org/tag/paula-lerner. For coverage of the award, see
Nat’l Acad. of Television Arts & Sci., 31st Annual News & Documentary Emmy Awards
(Sept. 27, 2010), http://www.emmyonline.tv/mediacenter/_pdf/news_31st_winners_v03.pdf.
287
E-mail from Beth Galton, Beth Galton Studio, to author (Apr. 9, 2011,
13:07 EST) (on file with author) (follow-up to in-depth interview (June 16, 2010)).
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shoot in a particular style or to shoot particular subjects is hard. But
if they see the work and it is good, they respond.288

It may be argued that basing policy on these snapshots
of how some photographers have structured their livelihoods so
as to produce creative work is tantamount to proposing that
copyright be used as “a form of protection for the industries of
the present at the expense of those of the future” or as a means
of preventing professional photography’s “natural death.”289
Likewise, it might be asked whether it follows from this line of
inquiry that the Supreme Court should have remanded in Feist
for further evidence of the creative side projects of the phone
book compilers whose incomes might have been crimped by the
decision. These are valid concerns. This article simply suggests
that, without close consideration of the ways in which tinkering
with the originality requirement may affect particular
industries,290 a well-intended proposal to increase creative
output may end up stifling just that sort of work.
According to the constitutional language, Congress is
accorded the power to protect the “Writings”—plural—of
authors.291 Perhaps this textual formulation highlights the
expectation that authorial careers will produce a range of
output, some of which may be quite banal but which serves to
support evolving grasps at greatness. Under this theory, even if
a photograph of an everyday commercial product or political
event is not a masterpiece, as long as it is plausibly original, it
can be seen as serving as a placeholder (or proxy) for the more
creative works that the copyright system hopes—but can never
guarantee—that an author will create over the course of his or
her career. Parchomovsky and Stein are surely correct to note
that “[i]f society wishes to encourage authors to produce highly
original works and not settle for the bare minimum necessary
to secure protection, it must reflect this preference in the
design of the law.”292 By viewing creativity across the span of a
career, we can explore whether and how, through mechanisms
288

Rob Haggart, Making the Break: Kevin Arnold, APHOTOEDITOR, (June 8,
2010), http://www.aphotoeditor.com/2010/06/08/making-the-break-kevin-arnold/ (quoting
photographer Kevin Arnold).
289
Tim Wu, On Copyright’s Authorship Policy, 2008 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 335, 348
(2008).
290
Cf. Justin Hughes, Copyright and Its Rewards, Foreseen and Unforeseen,
122 HARV. L. REV. F. 81, 92 (2009) (calling for copyright scholarship to better grapple
with the implications on industry of proposed changes).
291
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
292
Parchomovsky & Stein, supra note 17, at 1517.
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such as the low originality threshold, the current law may
already reflect such a preference.
CONCLUSION
This article has argued against a presumption of
protectability for photography. Copyright is the grant of a
limited monopoly and, therefore, where a work is challenged,
copyright plaintiffs owe society an explanation or
demonstration of what makes that work original. In most
cases, this can be done by way of evidence that is narrative or
comparative in nature. The proper application of originality
principles to photography entails protection against outright
copying in most cases293 but wide latitude to stage and shoot
similar subject matter found in earlier photographs. Any
initiatives to raise the bar for originality, however, should be
carefully considered.
Turning back to the Fairey case, this article concludes
by addressing, photographically, Luc Sante’s suggestion that
anyone could have taken a photographic shot equal in quality
to Mannie Garcia’s. Below I offer an uncropped, unmanipulated
photograph that I managed to snap from the fourth row of a
campaign speech. I had the access, and I took about forty shots,
of which this is by far the best. I am happy to have it, but it
probably would not have inspired a campaign poster.
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To reiterate, this comment is offered without factoring in any applicable
defenses to copying.

